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INTRODUCTION
Few arguments echo as strongly throughout United States
constitutional history as those related to the role of the states in the
federal union. Although scholars debate the extent to which
federal and state powers were ever strictly separated, the states and
the federal government today occupy overlapping spheres. In the
modern context of overlapping powers, the pre-emption doctrine
manages the intricate areas of overlap,1 with topics ranging from
banking, to food and drug laws, to immigration. As a general
matter, overlapping and concurrent powers are the norm, even
when the federal government has staked out considerable territory.
In one critical modern arena, however, the role of the states
has been relegated to little more than the curtailment of active
fraud. It is an insidious notion, rooted in a mistaken twist of
precedent, that then winds its way through various doctrines,
increasingly circumscribing the ability of the states to act. Patent
law is this arena, and here, the various threads come together
resulting in a positive chokehold on any state activity.
Paralysis for the states is occurring at a particularly important
time in the history of patent law. Government actors at many levels
are grappling with the emergence of a new business model in
patents. It is popularly called patent trolling or more tamely nonpracticing entity (NPE) activity or patent assertion entity (PAE)
activity. In this model, the core business involves licensing and
litigating stripped patent rights, as opposed to making products
with those patents. The rapid expansion of this business model
over the last decade has left courts and legislators grappling with its
legal implications.
The relevant federalism question concerns the extent to which
state laws that affect this type of business are valid. In other words,
does a state have the power to say that if one wishes to engage in
the business of asserting patents in this state, here are the basic
codes by which one must abide? In the modern context of
overlapping federal and state powers, this is classic territory,
involving both a state’s traditional ability to regulate business
within its borders and a federally-created scheme that involves the
power of federal sovereignty.
At present, courts and some early commentators have
concluded that states are confined to a tiny corner, policing
1. See generally Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The
Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253
(tracing the evolution of preemption doctrine).
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occurrences of outright bad faith or fraudulent activity. In the
patent context, these notions are generally defined to mean that the
patent holder’s statements are objectively false and the patent
holder knows they are false.2
Such a limitation on the power of the states cannot possibly be
right. Surely, if a patent holder sends a letter saying, “If you do not
buy a patent license from me, I will kill your family,” the state may
have something to say about it. This should be true even if the
patent is valid and the patent holder has a sufficiently plausible
infringement argument to withstand a charge of sham litigation. A
state must be able to specify certain things one cannot do with
one’s patent. And in that context, fraud cannot be the sole domain
in which the state may operate.
Some readers may think that the above example is simply a
straw man; no one could possibly take the position that states are
forbidden to act against such a threat. To those readers, I would
note that at a recent conference presenting this Article, one patent
scholar argued vigorously that states should be impotent to act if a
patent holder threatens to kill one’s family unless one pays for a
patent license. The scholar asserted that only the federal
government could respond, and any power to respond would have
to be found in the Patent Act.
This view might come as a surprise to state law enforcement
agencies, which are generally accustomed to having the power to
bring criminal charges for a threat of murder. Nevertheless, it is
emblematic of a strain of patent law analysis that sees states as
severely limited in their power over any activity in which patents
appear.
At a broader level, if states have the power to regulate
disclosure in the sale of federal securities, transparency for banking
2. See Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., Inc. 362 F.3d
1367, 1375–76 & n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (applying Supreme Court precedents in
antitrust cases to conclude that state lawsuits related to patent demand actions
outside of litigation must demonstrate that the behavior is both objectively and
subjectively baseless); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 101 VA.
L. REV. 1579, 1618–19 (2015) (explaining that while good faith takes on different
meanings in different contexts, good faith in patent enforcement has traditionally
referred to whether the speaker sincerely believed in the truth of the statement);
see also Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle Bancorp, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d 1157,
1166–69 (D. Neb. 2013) (issuing preliminary injunctions against the Attorney
General of Nebraska restraining the office from enforcing orders against two
parties for their patent demand letters on the grounds that demand letters are
preempted absent a showing of bad faith; allegations of unfair and deceptive
practices contained in the Attorney General’s papers apparently were
insufficient).
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and real estate transactions, and pressure sales tactics for businesses
from automobiles to insurance, why should states remain silent
when the topic of commerce is intellectual property?3 Commercial,
contractual, and consumer laws traditionally are viewed as
appropriate forums for reflecting and promoting local values—ones
that may vary across state jurisdictions.4 Quite simply, the states
must be left with something to do.5
Leaving room for state activity is particularly important in the
modern context of overlapping and concurrent federal and state
powers. As one scholar has noted, “[p]reemption must be cabined
more carefully . . . in a concurrent world where preemptive federal
action threatens to cut off state access to the wellsprings of popular
support.”6
Fraud is certainly valid terrain for state activity. Rather than
understanding fraud as an example of the territory in which a state
may tread, however, the lower courts have seized hold of the fraud
example and transformed it into a bright line beyond which a state
may not pass. As discussed later in the Article, this distortion is not
helped by open questions in federal preemption doctrine.
Nevertheless, whatever disputes may be happening at the margins
of federalism, one conclusion is clear: fraud remediation cannot be
the only permissible basis for state action, and the fraud fallacy
must be addressed.
Concerns reach well beyond the bounds of intellectual
property. The concepts embedded in the fraud fallacy are
expressed in general terms. Thus, if the legal system does not rein
in this jurisprudential approach, patent law could become the first
3. See, e.g., Blue Sky Laws, U.S. SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/bluesky.htm (last modified Oct. 14, 2014) (describing
state laws that govern securities); S. GUY PUCCIO, CAL. DEP’T OF REAL ESTATE,
DISCLOSURES IN REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS (2005), available at
http://www.dre.ca.gov/files/pdf/re6.pdf (describing California’s stringent real
estate disclosure regulations); cases cited infra note 20 (exemplifying sales tactics
courts have found to constitute improper pressure sales).
4. For discussions of intellectual property law in the context of respecting
these federalism values, see Camilla Hrdy, Commercialization Awards, 2015
WIS. L. REV. 13, 48, 58 (2015); Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property
Clause’s Preemptive Effect in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON
LAW 265, 279 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013); see also Gugliuzza, supra
note 2, at 1605–06 (discussing the fact that states traditionally have played a role
in disciplining abusive or improper assertion of legal rights); Ernest Young, Two
Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1387 (2001) (noting that
the states must be left with something to do).
5. See Young, Two Cheers, supra note 4, at 1387.
6. Young, Ordinary Diet, supra note 1, at 264.
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of many areas in which states find themselves severely constrained.
In that case, the role of the states in the federal union will have
traveled a long way from any notions embodied in federalism.
Section I of this Article discusses the modern patent demand
business model, describing the emergence of that model, the
extent of the activity, and examples of troubling behaviors. Section
II traces the tangled path the lower courts have taken to arrive at
the conclusion that a state’s ability to act is limited to fraud and
bad faith. That path begins with a set of Supreme Court cases from
the 1960s regarding a citizen’s First Amendment right to petition
government without fear of antitrust liability. Known as the
Noerr/Pennington cases, the cases hold that no antitrust liability
can attach when one petitions the government, even if that petition
would harm one’s competitors. The Noerr/Pennington cases
embody the notion that antitrust law cannot be allowed to chill the
exercise of one’s right to speak to the government.
The Federal Circuit then applies Noerr’s rule regarding the
limitations of federal antitrust law, extending the rule to create
limitations on state laws that might affect patents. It is a particularly
odd theoretical leap. Noerr can be understood as celebrating
states’ rights, in essence finding that citizens should be able to tell
their state legislatures how they want to be governed and that
federal law should stay out of the way. Thus, it is ironic that the
Federal Circuit dispatches Noerr to serve the opposite master—that
is, preventing states from responding to their citizens’ concerns.
Most importantly, missing from the Federal Circuit’s logic is the
Supreme Court’s focus on the chilling effect that antitrust’s treble
damages might have on one’s ardor for speaking to the sovereign.
Such treble damages concerns do not apply in the patent realm.
In addition to stretching the Noerr line of cases, the Federal
Circuit supports its preemption decisions with a series of thin and
shaky patent cases. The series begins with a breathtakingly short
decision from the early years of the Federal Circuit’s existence—a
ruling noting simply that a patent holder has the right to threaten
7
infringers with a lawsuit. While the statement is undoubtedly true,
it does not answer the question of the limits to which a patent
holder may go in enforcing those rights, not to mention whether a
state can regulate such actions. With only slightly more analysis
and support, the Federal Circuit then declared that patent holder
demands cannot be challenged unless those demands are in bad
7. See Concrete Unlimited Inc. v. Cementcraft, Inc., 776 F.2d 1537, 1539
(Fed. Cir. 1985).

36

COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV.

[Vol. XVII

faith—defined as whether the speaker believes in the truth of the
statement. From these shaky foundations, the Federal Circuit
constructed a rule that states are preempted from regulating any
patent demand behavior unless that behavior is both objectively
and subjectively baseless.
If the Federal Circuit’s logic is weak and without basis,
however, how should patent preemption apply in these
circumstances? After all, patent law is a federal scheme, and it
cannot be true that states are free to rummage around in
everything related to patents. Section III of the Article examines
these issues under Supreme Court preemption doctrine, both as
the doctrine applies to intellectual property and to other areas of
law. The section concludes that state law cannot be entirely
displaced simply because a particular commercial behavior relates
to patents.
Understanding the interplay between federal and state power
related to patent demands requires an understanding of the
commercial and economic context in which patent rights exist.
The granting of patents in the federal Patent Act relies upon and
presupposes a functioning state system of commerce and contract
law. Without this, inventors would be unable to form the
commercial relationships and licensing transactions necessary to
bring their ideas to fruition. The maintenance of conduct within
such systems is the proper domain of the state. Moreover, as noted
above, commerce, contract, and consumer laws traditionally are
viewed as appropriate for experimentation across state jurisdictions
and appropriate forums for reflecting local values. Thus, Section III
explains that states must have some space in which they can
express local preferences in relation to the business of patent
demands.
Section III also explores a theme that bubbles up through a
number of modern Supreme Court decisions. Although not clearly
articulated in the language of the cases, it provides a useful lens for
making sense out of preemption cases in general and patent
preemption in particular. One can call the concept “heart and
periphery.” Specifically, a state law that goes to the heart of federal
legislation is more likely to be problematic; a state law that affects
the periphery is more likely to be accepted. Section III explains
how the heart/periphery concept differs from the familiar
“congressional purpose” test in preemption analysis and describes
how the two concepts play out in modern cases.
Applying this analysis to the Patent Act, issues such as validity,
infringement, and procedures for challenging a patent lie at the
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heart of the federal scheme. Thus, a state’s ability to establish its
own rules related to these areas is more likely to be preempted. In
contrast, issues such as notice requirements, transparency,
protection against pressure sales tactics, basic contract principles,
and others stand at the periphery, and states should have breathing
space to establish their own dictates.
The most important point in Section III, however, is the
following: in moving through preemption analysis, none of the
possible approaches for analyzing a state’s proper role would
suggest that a state should be limited to policing fraud and bad
faith. That notion seems to be spun out of thin air.
I. THE MODERN PATENT ASSERTION BUSINESS MODEL
The rapid expansion of the non-practicing entity business
model has created challenges for courts and legislatures alike. In
the esoteric lingo of patent law, the term “non-practicing entity”
refers to a business that does not make products from the
inventions named in their patents. Rather, non-practicing entities
hold patents for the purpose of asserting them against companies
that do make products, on the grounds that those products are
infringing.
No one wants to be labeled a patent troll.8 Thus, there has
been much skirmishing over terms and definitions, with various
groups trying to ensure that the definition can be trimmed so that
they fall outside of it. Points of debate include whether the relevant
term should include those who buy patents as well as those who
were originally granted the patents. Should it include trusts and
individuals as well as corporations and partnerships? Should it
include only those who sue companies or also those who make
patent demands under the threat of transferring to those who will
sue? Do we call them NPEs, PAEs, PMEs, or simply trolls?
Although the debate is endlessly interesting, both from an
academic and a political perspective,9 this Article uses a simple
and broad notion: non-practicing entities are those who assert
patents as their core business activity. This Article also uses the

8. Robin Feldman, Patent Demands & Startup Companies: The View
From the Venture Capital Community, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 236, 244 (2014)
(“[N]o one wants to be branded a bad guy, and if patent trolls are bad guys,
everyone wants the definition to point somewhere else.”).
9. See id. at 244–54 (discussing the various terms used and their
implications).
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term most commonly found in the literature, NPE, despite its
resemblance to alphabet soup.
NPE activity has risen significantly over the last decade. The
number of patent lawsuits has more than doubled since 2007, with
much of the increase from lawsuits by NPEs.10 The increase in
litigation activity by NPEs can be measured both in terms of the
lawsuits filed and in terms of the number of defendants sued.
Although the amount of patent litigation declined in 2014 following
key Supreme Court decisions,11 lawsuit filings are still far above
2007 levels, before the modern increase began, and far above
levels going back for twenty years.12 In addition, despite the recent
Supreme Court decisions, new NPEs and new models of NPE
activity continue to blossom. One private study concluded that 143
new NPEs filed patent lawsuits in 2014.13 Although different studies
focus on different segments of the data, the results are remarkably
consistent across similar measures.14 The amount of litigation
activity from NPEs has risen substantially since 2007.
10. See Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500
Expanded: The Effects of Patent Monetization Entities , 17 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1,
42 (2013); see also Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in United States District Courts:
1994 to 2014, 101 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 17) (on file
with the Iowa Law Review), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2570803 (finding that patent litigation volume
doubled from 2010 to 2013).
11. See Robin Feldman, Theme of Restraint in Term’s IP Cases, DAILY
JOURNAL
(July
8,
2014)
https://www.dailyjournal.com/public/
pubmain.cfm?logout=&seloption=&eid=&vid=&CFID=8088329&CFTOKEN=234
29742 (describing key Supreme Court decisions in 2014).
12. See Feldman et al., Monetization Entities, supra note 10, at 42
(showing that the number of patent lawsuits rose from 2,512 in 2007 to 5,038 in
2012, using data from PACER, EDIS, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
website, and district court websites); see also Sag, supra note 10, at 19 tbl.3
(reporting the number of patent cases as 1,555 in 1994, 2,883 in 2007, 5,620 in
2012, and 5,368 in 2014, using data from Bloomberg Law and closely matching
the PACER data); id. at 17 fig.4 (demonstrating that while the number of patent
lawsuits doubled in the 16 years between 1994 and 2010, they doubled again
between 2010 and 2013).
13. RPX, 2014 NPE LITIGATION REPORT 6 (2015), available at
http://www.rpxcorp.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/03/RPX_LitigationReport-2014_FNL_040615.pdf.
14. Variation between studies generally depends on definitional choices
made by researchers. For example, using a sample of 500 patent infringement
cases, Jeruss, Feldman & Walker found that the proportion of lawsuits filed by
NPEs increased from 22% of cases in 2007 to almost 40% of cases in 2011. See
Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman & Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act 500:
Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH.
REV. 357, 377 (2012). Meanwhile, using the same sample, the nonpartisan
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Modern patent demand behavior frequently is based on
exploiting the costs and risks of litigation to extract a settlement,
rather than on the value of the patent. With two million patents
outstanding, serious concerns about patent quality,15 and patent
litigation defense costs often reaching well into the millions of
dollars, a rational company may choose to settle a patent demand,
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the proportion rose from
17% in 2007 to only 24% in 2011. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT
PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY
17 (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657103.pdf. The majority of
the difference can be explained by the GAO’s choice not to include individuals
and trusts as potential NPEs, choosing instead to focus only on entities organized
as corporations and partnerships. For a more detailed discussion on the choice
of who to include as a potential patent monetizer, see Feldman et al.,
Monetization Entities, supra note 10, at 4–6. Cotropia, Kesan, and Schwartz
(CKS) criticize the AIA 500 studies and conclude that “the often-repeated
‘explosion’ of PAE litigation from 2010 to 2012 is almost completely a myth” by
asserting that the number of alleged infringers and defendants did not increase
from 2010 to 2012. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L.
Schwartz, Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649,
655 (2014). However, CKS examine only litigation in 2010 and 2012 for their
study. By 2010, the increase in assertion activity was already well underway.
While it is certainly true that changes to joinder rules from the America Invents
Act contributed to the increase in the number of lawsuits filed in 2011 and
beyond, Feldman, Ewing & Jeruss (FEJ) show that the number of defendants
sued by monetizers has climbed substantially over time, from 1,814 in 2008 to
6,244 in 2011 and 4,606 in 2012. See Feldman et al., Monetization Entities, supra
note 10, at 44. Considering that the number of defendants has climbed
substantially despite AIA rules making it harder for multiple defendants to be
added to a patent infringement lawsuit, these results suggest an increase in total
litigation activity. Further, the CKS data for 2012 is not significantly different
from that of FEJ. FEJ found that 58.7% of cases in 2012 were filed by monetizers,
while CKS, who combined “large aggregators, patent holding companies, and
individuals” to define PAEs, found that 51.5% of cases were filed by PAEs. Also,
per calculations by CKS, FEJ found that 49.9% of alleged infringers in patent
cases were involved in monetizer suits in 2012. Using their definition of PAE,
CKS concluded this percentage was 46.9% in their study. See Cotropia et al.,
supra, at 692 tbl.2 & 692–94.
15. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 28–32
(detailing how many stakeholders believe some patents “have unclear property
rights and make overly broad claims”); COLLEEN V. CHIEN, NEW AM. FOUND.,
OPEN TECH. INST., PATENT ASSERTION AND STARTUP INNOVATION 15 (2013),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2321340 (reporting similar beliefs among
survey respondents); Shawn P. Miller, Where’s the Innovation: An Analysis of
the Quantity and Qualities of Anticipated and Obvious Patents, 18 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 6–7 (2013) (estimating that up to 39% of software patents and 56% of
business method patents could be found at least partially invalid, compared to
28% of all patents).
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even if the patent is weak or if the company is unlikely to be
infringing the patent. NPEs have become adept at pointing out the
costs and risks of challenging a patent demand in comparison to
the ease of purchasing a license.
Large-scale, generalizable information on the impact of NPEs
on innovation is difficult to come by. Nevertheless, the results of
small sample studies are not encouraging. These observations have
included troubling impacts NPEs have had on startups,16 a lack of
markers of innovation from NPE licensing,17 losses to businesses
due to NPE demands,18 and additional suggestions of negative
impacts on innovation.19 Other literature has reported pressure
sales tactics and disturbing behaviors, sometimes aimed at small
businesses or individuals.20
16. See, e.g., Feldman, Patent Demands, supra note 8, at 263–67 (finding
that 70% of venture capitalists have experienced patent demands against a
portfolio company, with 59% of the venture capitalists reporting that all or most
of these demands were launched by NPEs); CHIEN, PATENT ASSERTION, supra
note 15, at 10–11 (reporting that 75% of venture capitalists had received an NPE
demand against a company in their portfolio); see also Colleen V. Chien,
Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461, 472–78 (2014) (detailing
the costs and impacts of NPE demands on startups and small companies).
17. See Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do Patent Licensing
Demands Mean Innovation? (Feb. 15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Iowa Law Review), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2565292 (finding that NPE licenses rarely lead to
technology transfer).
18. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE
Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 408 & tbl.4 (2014) (estimating the direct
aggregate cost of NPE patent assertions to U.S. companies to be $29 billion in
2011).
19. See, e.g., Catherine Tucker, Patent Trolls and Technology Diffusion
(TILEC
Discussion
Paper
No.
2012-030,
2013),
available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2136955 (finding that sales of
a firm’s medical imaging software dropped by one-third during litigation, relative
to the firm’s products not covered by the litigated patents, and attributing this
drop to the lack of new product releases and stalled innovation among sued
companies); see also EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT
ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 9–10 (June 2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf
(discussing
the Tucker study and other evidence of costs to innovation); Fiona M. Scott
Morton & Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisitions, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 463,
482 (2014) (applying the “leaky bucket” concept to NPE demands to explain
how little revenue earned by NPEs is actually returned to original patentees, and
citing Bessen & Meurer, supra note 18, at 423, who find that only 20% of
payments to NPEs flows back to inventors or to research and development at
NPEs).
20. See, e.g., Robin Feldman & Tom Ewing, The Giants Among Us, 2012
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 30–31 (2012) (giving the example of a mass aggregator
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Much attention has focused on the impact of lawsuits and
litigation reform. Nevertheless, reports suggest that 90% of patent
demand activity never reaches the litigation stage. This activity
takes place largely outside the purview of the courts or other
sovereign authority.21 Such business approaches can be as simple
using escalating pressure to push companies to become “members” of the
aggregator); Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 250, 273–298 (2013) (detailing numerous examples of troubling schemes);
Assurance of Discontinuance (No. 14-015), In the Matter of the Investigation by
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, of MPHJ
Technology Investments, LLC 2–8 (assurance filed January 13, 2014), available
at http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/FINALAODMPHJ.pdf (announcing a settlement
against an NPE accused of deceptive tactics, such as: sending nearly identical
patent demands to hundreds of New York companies, falsely claiming that other
businesses had already entered into licensing agreements, conveying the
misleading “impression . . . that an outside attorney had conducting a
meaningful review of the facts and circumstances of [each business] alleged
infringement,” and creating hundreds of subsidiaries with “cryptic names” to
make “it more difficult to find information about the Company and the
Company’s licensing program”); Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Patent
Demands and Initial Public Offerings, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2015) (manuscript at 55) (on file with the Stanford Technology Law Review),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2591648 (finding evidence of companies
receiving patent demands shortly before or after their initial public offering). For
examples of sales techniques that courts have found to constitute improper
pressure sales tactics in areas outside of patent law, see Brown v. Kerkhoff, 279
F.R.D. 479 (S.D. Iowa 2012) (pressuring patients into paying for treatment
upfront in exchange for discount); M & T Mortg. Corp. v. Miller, 323 F. Supp.
2d 405, 413 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (abbreviated two-day sales contract period);
Niemiec v. Kellmark Corp., 581 N.Y.S.2d 569, 570–71 (Tonawada City Ct.
1992) (persistent telephone solicitation and requirement of immediate decision
on “once in a lifetime offer”); National Housewares, Inc., 90 F.T.C. 512, 568–569
(1977) (fast-talking sales pitch which does not give customer chance to think
about real purpose of sales presentation or object to it); State ex rel. Celebrezze
v. Consumer's Edge, Inc., No. 90CVH04-2646 1990 WL 677012, at *3 (Ohio
C.P. Oct. 1, 1990) (techniques that result in the customer's inability to
understand, review, and inspect the entire contract with care before signing); see
also Mass. Office of the Attorney Gen., 1993 REP. OF THE ATTN’Y GEN. 83
(discussing the successful conclusion of a case in 1992, titled Commonwealth v.
Greatex of Mass., Inc., which included tactics such as telling the consumer the
price would increase significantly if a contract was not signed immediately).
21. Robin Feldman, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 39 (2012) (“Throughout all
of the bargaining that a patent holder faces during the life of the patent, it is
important to note that only some of the process will involve the sovereign’s
active participation. Although judicial proceedings, agency reexaminations, and
even legislative changes will involve the sovereign’s participation in one of its
various forms, much of the process will take place outside the sovereign’s
purview. For some crucial junctures, such as the exchange of exploratory letters,
licensing negotiations, and internal decisions of what to defend and what to
abandon, the sovereign may not participate at all.”).
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as a call or letter saying, for example, “I have patents; you are
infringing them; it will cost $1–6 million in legal fees if you try to
fight; lots of people have taken licenses from me, so let’s just be
reasonable and work this out. Oh, and if you want any details, you
must sign a nondisclosure agreement.”
A number of states have begun reviewing this activity in the
context of their business or consumer protection codes,22 and one
could imagine a variety of categories that might be applicable to
the NPE business model. Potential laws could include transparency
requirements, such as the requirement to identify who the party
asserting the patent is and what patent claims are being asserted.
Other types of transparency considerations could include a
requirement to identify entities that the patent holder is related to
so the target could determine if it already holds a license from a
related entity.23 With the proliferation of non-disclosure agreements
and complex structures, targeted businesses and individual at times
have been unable to find even the most basic information, making
it difficult to challenge the patent or to know whether they already
hold a license.24 For example, the New York Attorney General’s
22. See Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringements, VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
9, §§ 4195–4199 (West, Westlaw through 2013–2014 Sess.) (delineating factors
that courts can consider as evidence of bad faith assertions of patent
infringement, and creating remedies and enforcement policies, making it the first
state to pass legislation against patent trolling). Since the passage of the Vermont
act, at least 17 other states have passed similar legislation, many of which are
nearly identical to the Vermont act. See, e.g., Actions for Bad Faith Assertion of
Patent Infringement, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, §§ 8701–8702 (West, Westlaw
through 2015 ch. 1); Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringement, VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 59.1-215.1–59.1-215.4 (West, Westlaw through 2015 ch. 1); Patent
Infringement Claims, MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 416.650–416.658 (West, Westlaw
through 2014 Sess.). Bills have been introduced in numerous other states. Patent
Progress’s Guide to State Patent Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS (last visited Mar.
24, 2014), http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patentprogresss-guide-state-patent-legislation/.
23. For an example of the problems target companies can encounter
without such information, see Summit Data Systems v. EMC Corp., Civil Action
No. 10-749-GMS, 2014 WL 4955689, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2014), aff’d sub
nom. Summit Data Systems v. NetApp Inc., No. 2015-1103, 2015 WL 5894214,
at *1 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 9, 2015) (large NPE collected settlements from five end-user
companies, ranging from $60,000 to $170,000 each, despite the fact that these
companies were covered by a license between the NPE and a third party).
24. See, e.g., Feldman & Ewing, The Giants Among Us, supra note 20, at
39–40 (describing how a company called Xilinx had several parties dismissed
from its declaratory judgment action against a mass aggregator because Xilinx
could not “identify the formal [patent] owner among a group of extremely
related parties,” all members of the aggregator’s “network of affiliated shell
companies”).
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office recently reached a settlement with an NPE, finding, among
other allegations, that the NPE had created hundreds of
subsidiaries for patent assertion activity, with cryptic names like
“CalNeb” and “JabTre” that made it difficult for targeted
businesses to discover any information about the company.25
Further, targets were required to sign non-disclosure agreements
before they were provided with basic information about the patents
in question.26 Other requirements might address notice issues, for
example, what is the target company doing that might be infringing
the patent. Still others could be designed to curtail pressure sales
tactics or to include information about relevant state offices.
Regardless of the merits of any particular requirement, the
underlying question remains: does a state have the power to say,
“if one wishes to engage in this type of business in our state, here
are the basic requirements one must abide by?”
II. THE RISE OF THE FRAUD FALLACY
In examining a state’s power to regulate the business of patent
assertion, lower courts have concluded that states are limited to the
remediation of active fraud or sham activity. The development of
this approach has occurred primarily at the Federal Circuit, 27 but
other courts have followed suit.28
In particular, the Federal Circuit has ruled that any behavior
involving a patent is governed by federal law and is not a matter of
state law.29 From this general rule, the Federal Circuit carved out a
25. See Assurance of Discontinuance (No. 14-015), Attorney General of
the State of New York, supra note 20, at 2.
26. Id. at 7.
27. See, e.g., GP Indus. v. Eran Indus., 500 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
28. Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle Bancorp, Inc., No. 8:13CV215, 2014
WL 197808, at *3 (D. Neb. Jan. 14, 2014); In re Innovatio IP Ventures, 921 F.
Supp. 2d 903, at *912 (N.D. Ill. 2013); cf. Red Wing Shoe Co. v. HockersonHalberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding that patent
holders are not subject to personal jurisdiction for declaratory judgment actions
based on demand letters); Integrity Mgmt. of Fla., LLC. v. Dental Websmith,
Inc., No. 4:08CV3079, 2008 WL 4372878, at *5 (D. Neb. Sept. 19, 2008) (same);
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Schumann, 474 F. Supp. 2d 758, 762 (M.D.N.C.
2006) (same); Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67
VAND. L. REV. 375, 429–30 (2014) (discussing the implications of the Federal
Circuit’s Red Wing decision and the decisions that have followed).
29. See, e.g., Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. Acres Gaming, Inc., 165 F.3d 891,
896 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[D]etermination of the propriety of [the patent holder’s]
actions in giving notice of its patent rights is governed by federal statute and
precedent and is not a matter of state tort law.”).
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narrow exception covering when patent holders engage in fraud
before the patent office or otherwise engage in “bad faith”
behavior.30 Specifically, the Circuit has ruled that “the protection
otherwise afforded by the patent laws to a patentee’s conduct in
enforcing its patent may be lost if the patentee acts in bad faith.”31
As will be described below, this is an odd way to think about
preemption, particularly Patent Act preemption. Nevertheless, the
Federal Circuit maintains this rule, even borrowing from antitrust
law to establish a high bar for bad faith. Those who wish to show
that a patent holder has acted in bad faith must demonstrate that
the party’s behavior satisfies the bad faith threshold both
subjectively and objectively.32
Other courts have followed the Federal Circuit’s lead. Consider
Activision v. Pinnacle, a procedurally complex case in the federal
district court of Nebraska.33 The Nebraska Attorney General’s
30. See Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., Inc., 362 F.3d
1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[S]tate law claims such as [the plaintiff’s] can
survive federal preemption only to the extent that those claims are based on a
showing of ‘bad faith’ action in asserting infringement.”); Zenith Elecs. Corp. v.
Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that bad faith is a
prerequisite for the state-law tortious interference claim and that without a
showing of bad faith, the claim is preempted by patent law); Hunter Douglas,
Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding
that federal law preempts state law regarding publicizing a patent in the
marketplace “unless the plaintiff can show that the patentholder acted in bad
faith”) overruled in part on other grounds by Midwest Indus., 175 F.3d 1356,
1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700,
710 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[I]nfringement notices have been enjoined when the
patentee acted in bad faith, for example by making threats without intending to
file suit.”).
31. Zenith, 182 F.3d at 1343.
32. See Globetrotter, 362 F.3d at 1368 (finding that the state law suit
related to actions outside of litigation failed because the plaintiff did not establish
that the patent holder’s actions were objectively baseless and referencing
requirements that the statements must be subjectively baseless).
33. Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle Bancorp, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (D.
Neb. 2013). The procedural complexity flows from the fact that the Nebraska
Attorney General first issued the cease and desist orders to Activision’s
attorneys, a firm with a reputation for representing non-practicing entities in
patent demand letter campaigns and which had sent the demand letters in
question. See Memorandum and Order 31, Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle
Bancorp, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (D. Neb. 2013) (8:13CV00215) (clarifying
that Nebraska’s cease and desist order related only to demand letters and
concluding that the attorneys could represent the Activision in any lawsuit
activity). The court later allowed the patent holder itself, Activision, to enter the
case and issued a preliminary injunction against the Nebraska Attorney General
and in favor of Activision and its attorneys. See Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle
Bancorp, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (D. Neb. 2013). Referencing the same logic,
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Office had opened investigations and issued cease and desist
orders against particular patent holders and their attorneys related
to demand letter activity. In briefing on the case, the Attorney
General, among other arguments, cited Supreme Court precedent
holding that unfairness is broader in scope than deception and
explained that common features of unfair practices include
coercive, high pressure sales and collection tactics.34 The Attorney
General went on to describe such tactics by the patent holders.35
Additional concerns expressed by other state Attorneys General
offices in similar cases include demand letters with little
information on either the identity of the patent holder, the
allegedly infringing activity, or the patents at issue so that recipients
cannot find sufficient information to file an action to prove noninfringement.36 This has been a problem for companies both large
and small.37 Regardless of whether the sender evidenced
fraudulent or bad faith intent, the effect on those receiving the
letters is the same and echoes the types of concerns that are
typically raised in state laws related to commercial practices.
the court later allowed another patent holder, MPHJ, to enter the suit, and
extended the preliminary injunction to cover current actions by Nebraska
against MPHJ and any future actions by the state against either Activision or
MPHJ. See Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle Bancorp, Inc., No. 8:13CV215, 2014
th
WL 197808 (D. Neb. Jan. 14, 2014). The 8 Circuit then granted the patent
holder’s request to transfer the appeal to the Federal Circuit, a decision that
stands somewhat in tension with a District Court opinion in a case involving the
Attorney General of Vermont. Compare Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle
Bancorp, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (D. Neb. 2013) (8th Cir. 13-03374)with State
of Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Investments, 763 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(mandamus petition to prevent district court from remanding patent demand
letter case to state court rejected by the Federal Circuit panel for lack of
jurisdiction in which district court had ruled that the case rested on Vermont
state law and that federal patent law issues are not necessarily raised).
34. See Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
and for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 21–23, Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle
Bancorp, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (D. Neb. 2013) (8:13CV00215) (citing FTC
v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972)).
35. See id.
36. See, e.g., Testimony of Vt. Att’y Gen. William H. Sorrell Before the
United States House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade, (April 8, 2014),
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20140408/102105/HHRG-113-IF17-WstateSorrellW-20140408.pdf.
37. See Order Re: Motions To Enjoin, Dismiss And/Or Transfer, Xilinx v.
Invention Investment Fund I LP, No. 11-CV-0671 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2011)
(describing the dismissal of Xilinx’s declaratory judgment action of noninfringement because Xilinx had named the wrong shell company in its papers).
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Nevertheless, in the Nebraska case, the trial court rejected
Nebraska’s arguments, issuing a series of preliminary injunctions
that prevented the Attorney General’s Office from enforcing its
orders. The trial court concluded that any state action against
demand letters is preempted unless there is a showing of bad faith.
The allegations of unfair and deceptive practices apparently were
insufficient. The court also ruled that Nebraska’s orders operated
as an improper prior restraint on speech, in violation of the First
Amendment. District courts in at least four other states have
echoed the bad faith requirement.38
Since 2013, more than 20 states have either passed legislation
related to patent holder behavior or have used existing legislation
to fight inappropriate patent holder behavior in their states.39
Sensing the winds, these state legislators and attorneys general on
the whole have attempted to carefully circumscribe their actions to
conform to the fraud and bad faith requirements. Thus, the
Federal Circuit’s pronouncements have had a profound effect on
the shape of state law and state behavior throughout the nation.
A. Setting the Stage: The Supreme Court’s Antitrust Immunity Cases
The bad faith requirement flows from an over-extension of
doctrines that have now been stretched well beyond the breaking
point. Beginning with Supreme Court case law concerning the
38. See, e.g., In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation, 921
F.Supp.2d 903, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Clearplay, Inc. v. Nissim Corp., No. 0781170-CIV, 2011 WL 3878363, at *7–8 (D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2011); DeSena v. Beekley
Corp, 729 F.Supp.2d 375, 401 (D.Me. 2010); Alien Tech. Corp., v. Intermec,
Inc., No. 3:06-CV-51, 2008 WL 504527, at *4 (D.N.D. Feb. 20, 2008).
39. Patent Progress’s Guide to State Patent Legislation , PATENT PROGRESS,
http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-progresssguide-state-patent-legislation/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2014). See, e.g., Bad Faith
Assertions of Patent Infringements, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195–4199 (West,
Westlaw through 2015–2016 Legis. Sess.) (delineating factors that courts can
consider as evidence of bad faith assertions of patent infringement, and creating
remedies and enforcement policies, making it the first state to pass legislation
against patent trolling). See also Assurance of Discontinuance (No. 14-015),
supra note 20. In many other states, the acts signed into law are nearly identical
to the Vermont legislation. See, e.g., Actions for Bad Faith Assertion of Patent
Infringement, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, §§ 8701–8702 (West, Westlaw through
2015); Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringement, VA. CODE ANN. tit. 59.1, §§
59.1-215.1–59.1-215.4 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); Patent
Infringement Claims, MO. ANN. STAT., tit. 26, §§ 416.650–416.658 (West,
Westlaw through 2014 Sess.). For a detailed description of the provisions of
these pieces of legislation, see Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption,
101 VA. L. REV. 1579 (2015).

2015]

THE FRAUD FALLACY

47

right to petition government to pass legislation, the Federal Circuit
eventually concludes that states may not pass any laws related to
patent demands, outside the realm of fraud or sham. As the
Federal Circuit spins this out, the doctrines become more and
more attenuated from the Supreme Court’s original concern about
chilling one’s ability to speak to the legislature.
The trail begins with a set of Supreme Court antitrust decisions
from the 1960s regarding the First Amendment right to petition the
government for a redress of grievances. This right is enshrined in
the First Amendment: “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or of the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances.”40 In case law commonly
known as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the Justices created a
general antitrust immunity for those who petition the government.
Specifically, parties are immune from antitrust liability for engaging
in conduct aimed at influencing governmental decision-making.
First, in construing the Sherman & Clayton Antitrust Acts in
Noerr Motor Freight, the Justices rejected an antitrust suit brought
against railroad industries for their campaign to prevent the
Pennsylvania legislature from passing a measure related to
permitting heavier trucking loads.41 The Justices stressed the right
of the people to inform representatives of their wishes regarding
passage or enforcement of laws, even in the hopes that such laws
may disadvantage their competitors in ways that fall “far short of
the ethical standards generally approved in this country.”42
The opinion reflected the Supreme Court’s deep concern that
the Sherman Antitrust Act should not be permitted to interfere
with the right of the people to engage in representative democracy.
With soaring language, the Justices noted that the three branches
of government act on behalf of the people and that “the whole

40. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
41. See Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight
Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). The railroads responded with their own antitrust
counterclaims against the trucking industry for the legislative fight, which were
denied by a lower court and not appealed. Id. at 145.
42. See id. at 139–140 (finding that “[t]he right of the people to inform
their representatives in government of their desires with respect to the passage or
enforcement of laws cannot properly be made to depend upon their intent in
doing so. It is neither unusual nor illegal for people to seek action on laws in the
hope that they may bring about an advantage to themselves and a disadvantage
to their competitors”).
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concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people
to make their wishes known to their representatives.”43
Thus, although the Federal Circuit would eventually enlist this
opinion to prevent states from enacting patent demand legislation
at the behest of their populations, the Noerr opinion did the
opposite. In Noerr, the Supreme Court championed the ability of
state governments to respond to the desires of their citizens and
rejected attempts to stifle that process through a piece of federal
legislation.
In the decade after Noerr, the Supreme Court expanded the
range of activities protected from antitrust liability. In United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, the Supreme Court extended the
protection to include attempts to influence regulatory officials,
specifically, the Secretary of Labor in the context of labor and
wage negotiations.44 In the California Motor Transport case, the
Court extended antitrust immunity to include appeals to the courts,
as well as to regulatory bodies and legislatures.45
Having firmly established the notion of antitrust immunity for
petitioning the government, the Supreme Court in 1993 tackled the
tricky question of when that antitrust immunity might be lost.46 In
the original case in this series, Noerr, the Justices had left the door
open a crack for a hypothetical way in which immunity from
antitrust action could be forfeited. The opinion commented that,
There may be situations in which a publicity campaign,
ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action,
is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than
an attempt to interfere directly with the business
relationships of a competitor and the application of the
Sherman Act would be justified. But this certainly is not the
case here. No one denies that the railroads were making a

43. Id. at 137. The Justices also emphasized the difference between
regulation of business activity and the regulation of political activity, noting that
nothing in the Sherman Act’s legislative history suggested an intent to regulate
the political arena. See id.
44. See United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965).
45. See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510
(1972).
46. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indust., Inc.,
508 U.S. 49 (1993).
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genuine effort to influence legislation and law enforcement
practices.47
The language offered no more than a hint, and a puzzling one
at that. How could an attempt to influence legislation not be an
attempt to influence legislation, and how would one show that?
Nevertheless, the Justices allowed a sham allegation to go
forward in the California Motor Transport case. The Justices found
the allegation that the defendants had not “sought to influence
public officials” to be sufficient.48 Rather, the Justices concluded
that the defendants sought “to bar their competitors from
meaningful access to adjudicatory tribunals and so to usurp that
decision-making process” instituting proceedings and actions “with
or without probable cause, and regardless of the merits of the
case.”49
Two decades later, the Supreme Court did its best to slam the
door, expressing frustration that the lower courts had defined sham
“in inconsistent and contradictory ways.”50 The Justices described
as “prescient” an earlier observation that the term sham might
become “no more than a label courts could apply to activity they
deem unworthy of antitrust immunity.”51 In light of these concerns,
the Justices in Professional Real Estate set a high bar for
demonstrating sham activity for the purposes of an antitrust case.
Specifically, one must demonstrate that the defendant’s
anticompetitive activity was a sham, from both an objective and
subjective standpoint.52 This antitrust case became the peg on
which the lower courts would hang their modern patent
preemption jurisprudence.
B. Lower Courts Import Antitrust Case Law into Patent Preemption
As described above, the Supreme Court set a high bar for what
constitutes sham activity that is sufficient to bring an antitrust claim.
The Federal Circuit took this notion and ran with it at full speed.
As the Federal Circuit has stretched out the doctrine, however, it
47. Eastern Railroad Presidents v. Noerr, 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961).
48. Cal. Motor Transp. v. Trucking, 404 U.S. at 511–512 (internal
quotation mark omitted).
49. Id. at 512.
50. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indust., Inc., 508
U.S. at 55.
51. Id. at 55 (citing Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, 486 U.S.
492, 508 (1988)).
52. Id. at 57.
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became more and more attenuated from the context of antitrust’s
treble damages and the Supreme Court’s original concern that the
threat of such liability could chill one’s ardor for speaking to the
legislature. This progression will be traced through a series of
Federal Circuit cases below.
In addition to stretching the Noerr doctrine, the Federal
Circuit’s line of cases presses into service several patent law
notions, related to federal preemption and appropriate patent
demand behavior, that rest on extremely shaky foundations. The
series of cases begins with a short Federal Circuit decision from the
early years of that court’s existence.53 In the 1985 case of Concrete
Unlimited v. Cement,54 the Federal Circuit began by agreeing with
the trial court that the patent was invalid as obvious over the prior
art. The court then rejected claims related to what the trial court
had deemed “threats and infringement actions based on the
fraudulently obtained patent.”55 The Federal Circuit’s decision
offered little discussion, noting simply that a patent holder has the
right to enforce its patent, and that Concrete merely did what any
patent owner has the right to do, including threatening infringers
with suit.
The fact that a patent holder has the right to enforce its patent
and to threaten infringers with a lawsuit is clearly true. That simple
statement, however, does not answer the question of the limits to
which a patent holder may go in enforcing those rights.
With little more analysis than the declaration in Concrete, the
Federal Circuit declared a decade later that demands from patent
holders cannot be challenged as long as they are promulgated in
good faith. The good faith requirement was added without
elaboration in Mallinckrodt, a case that has been overruled sub
silencio by the Supreme Court on other grounds.56
The cases cited in Mallinckrodt provided scant support for
such a sweeping generalization. In addition to citing the cursory
declaration in Concrete, which said nothing about good faith,
Mallinckrodt cited language from an older Supreme Court case,57
53. The Federal Circuit was promulgated by the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) which
amended 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-51).
54. Concrete Unlimited Inc. v. Cementcraft, Inc., 776 F.2d 1537 (1985).
55. See id. at 1538.
56. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 701 (Fed. Cir. 1992),
abrogated by Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008). See
Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575, 585
(E.D. Ky. 2009).
57. See Mallinckrodt v. Medipart, 976 F.2d at 709–710.

2015]

THE FRAUD FALLACY

51

which also did not support the new rule. Specifically, in 1913, the
Supreme Court considered antitrust claims against a patent holder
in Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co.58 The case included an
allegation that certain lawsuits were part of a larger antitrust
scheme.59 The Justices noted that it would take something more
than simply filing a lawsuit to create illegality, and stressed that the
claims in the case involved an antitrust action seeking treble
damages:
Patents would be of little value if infringers of them could
not be notified of the consequences of infringement, or
proceeded against in the courts. Such action, considered by
itself, cannot be said to be illegal. Patent rights, it is true,
may be asserted in malicious prosecutions as other rights,
or asserted rights, may be. But this is not an action for
malicious prosecution. It is an action under the Sherman
antitrust act for the violation of the provisions of that act,
seeking treble damages. (emphasis added).60
Thus, the Justices in Virtue Creamery certainly did not suggest
that bad faith should be the only basis to challenge a patent
lawsuit, and in fact, did not mention bad faith at all. Nevertheless,
the Federal Circuit elevated the simple statement that filing a
patent lawsuit by itself is not actionable, to a blanket rule that no
patent demand activity of any kind is actionable unless the activity
is in bad faith.61
The Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt also referenced an older
Second Circuit case, which did not directly conclude that bad faith
is the only basis for challenging patent demands.62 The Second
Circuit case concerned an actual finding of bad faith from the trial
court, on an allegation that the patent holder sent threats to sue
despite never intending to file a lawsuit. In an opinion focused on
the meaning of bad faith, the Second Circuit rejected the trial
evidence, particularly the trial court’s failure to appropriately

58. See Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 227 U.S. 8 (1913).
59. Id. at 37.
60. Id. at 37–38 (emphasis added).
61. And, of course, Virtue v. Creamery was an antitrust case, with the
special considerations that such cases entail. See id.
62. See Mallinckrodt v. Medipart, 976 F.2d at 710 (citing Kaplan v.
Helenhart Novelty Corp., 182 F.2d 311, 314 (2d Cir. 1950) (citing Kelly v.
Ypsilanti Dress-Stay Mfg. Co, 44 F. 19 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1890))).
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consider the patent holder’s explanation for never filing suit.63
Thus, the Second Circuit opinion concerned the meaning of bad
faith but never directly stated that bad faith is the only basis for
challenging patent demands. Moreover, in providing support for its
holding, the Second Circuit opinion cited an 1890 case implying
that bad faith would not be the only basis for a challenge. The
Circuit Court decision from Michigan, Kelly v. Ypsilanti,
considered a libel suit against a patent holder for sending letters to
a potential infringer’s customers.64 Among other reasons for
rejecting the claim, the court noted that the language of the notices
was “perfectly respectful and courteous” and “nothing . . . to which
the person receiving it can take a just exception.”65 The court also
noted that there was undoubtedly authority for granting an
injunction “if the language of such letters or circulars be false,
malicious, offensive, or opprobrious, or used for the willful
purpose of inflicting an injury.” While one could argue that false
circulars would be in bad faith—in the sense of being made up of
baseless assertions66—offensive or opprobrious ones certainly would
not. Even the notion of “used for the willful purpose of inflicting
injury” would not clearly fall within the definition of bad faith. In
other words, contrary to the Federal Circuit’s Mallinckrodt
opinion, the Ypsilanti court noted that there are a variety of bases
for challenging patent demands. On thin reeds such as these,
however, the Federal Circuit moved forward with its
pronouncement that demands from patent holders cannot be
challenged, as long as the demands are promulgated in good faith.
The old cases cited in Mallinckrodt were part of a line of
federal cases originating in the 1880s in which courts exercised
their powers of equity to enjoin inappropriate patent holder
behavior.67 The decisions frequently focused on concerns about
threats and intimidation, for example, noting that “acts of
intimidation should fall within the preventive reach of a court of
equity” and that while those in business avoid lawsuits of any kind,
patent suits are so far outside of people’s knowledge base that they
63. See Kaplan v. Helenhart Novelty Corp, 182 F.2d 311, 313–314 (2d Cir.
1950).
64. See Kelly v. Ypsilanti Dress-Stay Mfg. Co, 44 F. 19 (C.C.E.D. Mich.
th
1890). The case was decided by the predecessor court to the 6 Circuit.
65. Id. at 23.
66. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 101 VA. L. REV.
1579 (2015) (explaining that while good faith takes on different meanings in
different contexts, good faith in patent enforcement has traditionally referred to
whether the speaker sincerely believed in the truth of the statement).
67. See Gugliuzza, supra note 39, at 35–37 (describing these cases).
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are “terrorized by even the threat of such a suit.”68 The concerns
about preventing intimidation echo across time, but one might
suspect that the analysis of which behaviors raise intimidation
concerns would benefit from being updated a century later.
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit fixated on the behaviors that
emerged in these cases, and the notion that evidence of bad faith is
the only basis upon which patent holder behavior can be
restrained.
Most importantly, these early cases did not seem to
contemplate whether the good faith rule arose as a matter of
federal law or state law, let alone whether preemption might come
into play. Although both state and federal law claims were raised
in the cases at times, the decisions were simply discussed in general
terms of what one does with a patent. Nevertheless, the Federal
Circuit used these cases to move another step toward its
pronouncement that demands from patent holders cannot be
challenged, as long as the demands are promulgated in good
faith.69
C. Wrapping the Weak “Bad Faith” Decisions into a Patent Preemption
Doctrine
The preemption notion would grow out of another set of
Federal Circuit decisions. In the 1991 case of Abbott Labs v.
Brennan, the Federal Circuit considered whether state law
remedies might be available for improper behavior at the Patent &
Trademark Office during the patent application process.70
68. See Emach v. Kane, 34 F. 46, 50, 52 (N.D. Ill. 1888).
69. A later Federal Circuit case citing this line of logic would cite Section
287 of the Patent Act as further support. See Mikhon Gaming Corp. v. Acres
Gaming, Inc. 165 F.3d 891, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[p]atentee has the right to
inform a potential infringer of the existence of the patent . . . [t]he statute
contemplates such notice. See 35 U.S.C. Section 287.”). Section 287 allows
patent holders to mark their goods to provide notice that the good is covered by
a particular patent and specifies that a patent holder may not recover damages
unless the patent holder notified the infringer in one of a variety of methods and
the infringement continued. It is certainly true that the statute contemplates and
even requires notice to potential infringers. Federal authorization of notice,
however, does not answer the question of whether certain behavior in the
context of notice might violate state statutes.
70. See Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Getting
lost in bad faith is understandable. A number of the cases that arose during this
period were based on claims that required an allegation of bad faith, such as
inequitable conduct. Nevertheless, although bad faith may be a key to certain
type of claims, no logic suggests that bad faith behavior should be the only basis
upon which a state may act.
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Declining to opine about administrative proceedings in general, the
court ruled on what it described as the narrow question: “whether
the state tort action for abuse of process can be invoked as a
remedy for inequitable or other unsavory conduct of parties to
proceedings in the Patent & Trademark Office.”71 The court
declined to allow a state law remedy, concluding that the process
of granting a patent falls within the purview of federal law.
Without discussing potential differences between antitrust and
patent statutes, the Abbott court referenced the Noerr line of cases.
It concluded from Noerr that no state law abuse of process claim
could arise for activity at the Patent & Trademark Office, unless
“the entire federal agency action was a ‘sham.’”72
The question of whether there can be a state remedy for
misbehavior at a federal agency raises particular preemption
complications.73 Nevertheless, through a series of cases in 1998–
1999, the Federal Circuit combined its patent law “bad faith”
rulings with its preemption decisions regarding state law claims for
actions at the federal patent office to create an awkward, bifurcated
rule. Specifically, the Federal Circuit ruled that any state law claims
related to patent holder conduct in obtaining or publicizing a
patent are preempted unless 1) the patent holder engaged in fraud
before the patent office or 2) the patent was publicized in bad
faith.74
The Federal Circuit is no stranger to promulgating awkward
rules and tests in its patent jurisprudence that have been later
rejected by the Supreme Court. In particular, the odd, bifurcated
rule described above is reminiscent of the now discredited
“machine-or-transformation” test, which arose in the Federal
71. Id. at 1355.
72. See id. at 1356.
73. In fact, a Federal Circuit panel a few years later would distinguish
Abbott, holding that a state law claim for intentional interference with
contractual relationships based on patent demand activity is not preempted by
federal law. See Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp, 139, F.3d 1470, 1472, 1477
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
74. See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318,
1336–1337 (Fed. Cir. 1998), overruled by Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan
Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir 1999). For a case that applies the
“publicizing in bad faith” prong, characterizing this prong as required by
preemption, see Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. Acres Gaming, Inc., 165 F.3d 891,
896 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“National uniformity, in confluence with the national scope
of the patent grant and the general federal exclusivity in patent causes, require
that determination of the propriety of Acres’ actions in giving notice of its patent
rights is governed by federal statute and precedent and is not a matter of state
tort law.”).
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Circuit at the same time.75 With the machine-or-transformation
rule, the Federal Circuit held that a process satisfies patentable
subject matter if 1) it is tied to a particular machine, or 2) it
transforms a particular article into a different state.76 The machineor-transformation rule was not well received when it reached the
Supreme Court. In a quartet of cases, the Supreme Court would
first note that the machine-or-transformation test could not be the
sole test (although it might offer an important and useful clue),77
and would eventually jettison the test entirely, focusing on the
underlying concepts from which the Federal Circuit had tried to
construct the rule.78 As the Justices noted, nothing in the ordinary
meaning of the statutory authority “would require [inventions
either] to be tied to a machine or to transform an article.”79
The discredited machine-or-transformation test and the odd
bifurcated preemption test suffer from the same flaws. The
problem lies in forgetting that such “tests” are merely a proxy for
the underlying concepts.80 It is not that everything embodied in the
test is wrong, or that the notion of developing a proxy is wrong, the
problem lies in allowing the proxy to take on a life of its own,

75. See Robin Feldman, A Conversation on Judicial Decision-Making, 5
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 21 (2013) (the “Federal Circuit [ ] derive[d] the
requirement that all process patents must constitute either a machine or
transformation” from the Supreme Court’s decision in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63 (1972)). See also FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW, supra note 21, at
91–135.
76. See, e.g., State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group,
Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d
943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
77. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 659 (2010) (“Adopting the
machine-or-transformation test as the sole test for what constitutes a ‘process’ (as
opposed to just an important and useful clue) violates these statutory
interpretation principles.”).
78. See id. at 601–02, 606–09; Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293–94 (2012); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107, 2116–17 (2013); Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v.
CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354–55 (2014); see also Robin Feldman,
Coming of Age for the Federal Circuit, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 27, 32 [hereinafter
Coming of Age] (discussing the Supreme Court’s patentable subject matter test
of first determining whether the patent is directed to one of several ineligible
categories, such as an abstract idea, and second, looking at any additional
elements in the claim to see if the core of what is new, “the inventive concept”
adds enough).
79. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. at 617.
80. See Feldman, Coming of Age, supra note 78, at 33; see also Mayo v.
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1303 (noting that the exceptions to patentable subject
matter serve as a “proxy for the underlying ‘building-block’ concern”).
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disembodied from the underlying concepts.81 With both of these
tests, the Federal Circuit picked out isolated elements, constructing
a test as if these were the sole examples, rather than developing a
test that embodied the entirety of the underlying concept.
To its credit in these cases, the Federal Circuit does identify
key issues in a preemption analysis and notes the importance of
the role that states play in regulating contracts and business
behavior. For example, the Federal Circuit explains that
commercial contracts traditionally are the domain of state law,82
and it waxes poetic on the notion that “[i]t is difficult to fathom
how such a state law cause of action could have any discernible
effect on the incentive to invent, the full disclosure of ideas, or the
principle that ideas in the public domain remain in the public
domain.”83 Nevertheless, at the end of the day, the Federal Circuit
chooses its odd bifurcated test, in which state law is preempted
unless the patent holder engaged in fraud before the patent office
or the patent was publicized in bad faith.84
D. Importing the Supreme Court’s Antitrust Test into the Bad Faith Patent
Preemption Rule
From this shaky foundation, the Federal Circuit builds an even
weaker construct by importing the Supreme Court’s test for
petitioning the government in antitrust cases into patent demand
notices. As described above, the Justices in Professional Real Estate
set a high bar for demonstrating sham activity for the purposes of
an antitrust claim.85 In choosing to apply the antitrust standard to
patent cases, the Federal Circuit observed that a number of circuits
had applied this high bar, not just to antitrust cases regarding
petitioning the legislature—the original Noerr circumstances—and
not just to antitrust cases involving litigation—the Professional Real
81. See Feldman, Coming of Age, supra note 78, at 33.
82. Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1477 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (citing Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 44 U.S. 257, 262 (1979)); see
also Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1334 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (noting in the context of field preemption that “Title 35 [the Patent
Act] occupies the field of patent law, not commercial law between buyers and
sellers” and that “the regulation of business affairs is traditionally a matter for
state regulation”).
83. Dow v. Exxon, 139 F.3d at 1475 (referencing Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974)).
84. See Hunter Douglas v. Harmonic, 153 F.3d at 1336–37.
85. See supra text accompanying note 2 (explaining the requirement that
one must demonstrate activity was a sham, both from an objective and from a
subjective perspective, in antitrust cases).
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Estate circumstances—but to antitrust activities involving demands

outside of litigation.86 These cases rested on the logic that if a
particular immunity from antitrust liability applies to filing lawsuits,
then the same immunity should apply to threats to file patent
lawsuits. After all, threats to file a lawsuit could eventually lead to a
lawsuit. The problem with this logic, particularly in the context of
patent demands, is that patent threats take place outside the
purview of a judge. As such, they are not subject to the potential
disciplining effect that judicial proceedings have the potential to
bring.
The Federal Circuit noted that these cases extending
Professional Real Estate’s high bar almost exclusively involved
antitrust liability.87 Nevertheless, the court ruled that this high bar
should be applied to patent cases as well and to demand activity
outside of litigation. Not finished yet, the Federal Circuit raised the
bar even further by ruling that plaintiffs must establish bad faith by
clear and convincing evidence, rather than by the lower standard
of preponderance of the evidence.88 At the end of the day, the
Federal Circuit cobbled together the following doctrine: all state
laws relating to patent demand activity outside of litigation are
preempted unless the activity in question is both objectively and
subjectively baseless, a finding that must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.
In creating this rule, the Federal Circuit has strayed far from
the original concerns that animated the Supreme Court in Noerr.89
Rather than protecting the right to petition the legislature from the
chilling effect of antitrust’s treble damages, the doctrine has been
stretched to protect behavior involving patent demands from
regulation by the states.

86. See Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., Inc., 362 F.3d
1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Coastal States Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d
1358, 1367 (5th Cir. 1983); McGuire Oil Co. v. Mapco, Inc., 958 F.2d 1552, 1560
n.12 (11th Cir. 1992); A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 F.3d
239, 252–53 (3d Cir. 2001); Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 219
F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 2000); Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 936–38 (9th
Cir. 2006); In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 685–86
(2d Cir. 2009); Philip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶ 205f–
g, at 302–10 (4th ed. 2013). But cf. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball
Players Ass’n, 208 F.3d 885, 890–91 (10th Cir. 2000).
87. See Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., Inc., 362 F.3d
at 1376.
88. See Golan v. Pingel, Ent. Inc., 310 F.3d 1360, 1371–73 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
see also Gugliuzza, supra note 2, at 1625 (describing Golan).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 40–51 (describing Noerr).
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In short, the Federal Circuit has enlisted Noerr to serve the
opposite master of its original design. As described at the start of
this section, Noerr can be understood as championing states’ rights.
Citizens should be able to tell their state legislators how they want
to be governed, and the federal government should stay out of the
way. Ignoring this, the Federal Circuit has dispatched Noerr to
suppress states’ rights, eventually concluding that federal law
preempts almost any state law related to behavior involving patent
demands. Throughout this journey, the Federal Circuit has lost its
way, jumbling questions together and sliding from one concept to
another, without the strong foundation that can support enduring
doctrinal analysis.
E. How Should One Analyze Whether Noerr Applies to Patent Demands
Outside of Litigation?
If the Federal Circuit is wrong, however, how should one
analyze whether Noerr or other federal doctrines apply to the
issues at hand? The solution rests on a comparison of the original
issues addressed in Noerr to the issues that arise with patent
demands outside of litigation.
Noerr concerned the question of whether a federal scheme—
embodied in the federal antitrust statutes—was being applied in a
way that would interfere with the right to petition government.
Over time, the line of cases at the Supreme Court level would
consider whether application of the federal antitrust statutes was
getting in the way of an approach to the legislature, an approach to
regulatory bodies, and eventually, an approach to the courts.90
In contrast, the question for demand letters concerns whether a
state scheme could get in the way of an effort to vindicate rights
granted under a federal scheme. Answering that question requires
several layers. The first layer involves the rights that have been
granted under the federal scheme. Perhaps the federal scheme
itself preempts the type of state statute at issue? As described
above, the Federal Circuit’s analysis of that question has been
tremendously thin and weak. In addition, to the extent that the
question relates to statutory preemption, such an analysis must rest
on an examination of the Patent Act, not on a discussion of other
federal schemes, such as the Noerr analysis of the antitrust statutes.
Section III below will analyze preemption implications arising from
the Patent Act.
90. The lower courts would extend the logic to encompass pre-suit
communications as well.

2015]

THE FRAUD FALLACY

59

The second layer is the following: regardless of statutory
preemption, does the state law violate the First Amendment right
to petition government? This is a question of a different texture,
but once again, the question must be grounded in an examination
of the specific rights and regimes involved. In other words, is there
something about the state statute that chills the patent holder’s right
to petition government in a manner that rises to the level of a
constitutional violation? In answering this question, it is helpful to
look at the two other circumstances in which the Justices have
applied the logic of Noerr outside of antitrust.
The Supreme Court has used the Noerr logic by analogy in
two other circumstances, one related to labor activity and one
related to civil rights boycott activity. In each of these two cases,
along with Noerr itself, the Court carefully examined the legislative
schemes involved, as well as any special burdens or considerations
that were relevant to potentially chilling the right to petition
government. In the Noerr line of cases, the concern over the
chilling effect revolved around antitrust’s harsh threat of treble
damages, and whether application of that federal scheme was
interfering with the right to petition government. In NAACP v.
Claiborne,91 the Court extended Noerr immunity to protect
nonviolent boycotting activities. The NAACP case involved a state
law tort claim for malicious interference with business relationships
in light of the boycott activity.92 Thus, the question was whether
state tort law, as applied in this circumstance, interfered with the
right to petition government for political change. Although the
boycott activity did not directly petition the legislators, the boycott
clearly was aimed at encouraging political change, a core First
Amendment concern.93 As the Justices noted, the case implicated
the special recognition afforded a federal constitutional
amendment and in particular, the importance of Fourteenth
Amendment rights.94
The final case, Bill Johnson’s Restaurants v. NLRB,95 operated
as a vindication of the importance of state interests, particularly a
state’s ability to provide a civil remedy for conduct touching on
91. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
92. Id. at 892.
93. See Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 186 (1999)
(finding that core political speech, such as petition circulation, “involves
‘interactive communication concerning political change’ . . . [and] First
Amendment protection for such interaction [ ] is ‘at its zenith.’”) (citing Meyer v.
Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422, 425 (1988)).
94. See id. at 914–15.
95. Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983).
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issues deeply rooted in local sentiment. The case involved an
attempt by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to enjoin a
suit by an employer in state court. The NLRB argued that filing the
state court suit was an act of retaliation for protected labor
activities. The Justices allowed the state lawsuit to go forward,
ruling that “a well-founded lawsuit may not be enjoined as an
unfair labor practice, even if it would not have been commenced
but for the plaintiff’s desire to retaliate against the defendant for
exercising rights protected by the Act.”96 Delving deeply into the
Labor Act and the Court’s accompanying jurisprudence, the
Justices stressed that in light of the “recognition of the States’
compelling interest in the maintenance of domestic peace,” the
Court had “repeatedly construed the Act as not preempting the
States from providing a civil remedy for conduct touching interests
‘deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility.’”97 Thus, in Bill
Johnson’s Restaurant, the Supreme Court did not allow a federal
scheme to enjoin recourse to the courts, showing particular
concern for a state’s ability to respond to behavior that implicates
local concerns.
Thus, the two circumstances in which the Supreme Court has
extended Noerr outside of antitrust do not provide much hope for
a similar extension in the case of patent demands. As a general
matter, the Court has carefully examined the legislative schemes
involved, along with any special burdens or considerations, and
the Justices have shown particular concern for a state’s ability to
respond to local concerns, even in the face of federal schemes.
In addition, Noerr and its Supreme Court progeny are
specifically focused on potentially chilling the right to petition
government in the form of an appeal to the legislature or the
courts. In contrast, the type of state patent troll legislation under
consideration would not enjoin recourse to the legislature or the
courts at all. Patent holders would be free to file and litigate a
patent lawsuit at any time, the course of which would be governed
by the appropriate federal patent and civil litigation rules.98 Rather,
the state statutes would relate entirely to activity outside of the
courthouse. Such behavior takes place entirely outside the purview
of the sovereign, making it much more susceptible to abuse.

96. See id. at 743.
97. See id. at 741.
98. Section 287 of the Patent Act provides that patent holders must give
notice of their patent in order to recover damages. The statute specifies,
however, that filing a lawsuit constitutes notice. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a).
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To some extent, one could argue that the states are actually
trying to protect access to the courts for those who receive patent
demands. The chilling effect of a threat of treble damages is
reversed in the case of patent law, given that a patent holder,
sending a cease and desist order to a company, can threaten to
impose the risk of treble damages. When settlement demands
include pressure sales tactics,99 such tactics may have the effect of
frightening an accused infringer away from trying to validate its
rights in court—precisely the type of chilling effect that animates
concerns over the right to petition government. Other approaches
can confuse patent holders into thinking that they cannot vindicate
themselves in court, or that it would be hopeless to try. A state
statute, attempting to curb such tactics, for example, would align
with First Amendment interests by protecting targets’ access to
courts from the chilling tactics of NPEs. In contrast, a doctrine that
severely limits a state’s rights to pass such legislation should raise
First Amendment concerns over the right to petition government.
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s rule in antitrust cases that
activity is immunized unless it is both objectively and subjectively
baseless is particularly inapt for patent law. Uncertainties about the
boundaries of an individual patent and the meaning of each word
within a patent are endemic to the patent system. One could argue
that the uncertainty flows from inevitable elements in the patent
system—for example, the fact that scientific innovation is rapidly
changing, and that the words of a patent must constantly be
compared to products that did not exist when the patent was

99. See Feldman & Ewing, The Giants Among Us, supra note 20, at 28–29
(describing mass aggregator RPX’s notice to Kaspersky Labs “that RPX had
acquired the patents in the lawsuit [against 22 other companies] and could
release Kaspersky from the suit in exchange for a 3-year membership in RPX at
a cost of $160,000 a year” and that “RPX could sell its patents to third parties to
be used against non-RPX members”); see also id. at 26–29 (describing horizontal
collusion and other anticompetitive tactics by mass aggregators). Customer
letters provide a variation on this theme. Consider, for example, the letters sent
to a competitor’s distributors and contractors in the GP Industries case. They
accuse the competitor of engaging in mail fraud, interstate transportation of
stolen property and an unlawful pattern of racketeering activity in violation of
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The letters
conclude by noting that they are “intended to place you on notice that Eran
Industries will consider naming your company as an additional defendant.” See
GP Indus. Inc. v. Eran Indus. Inc., 500 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also
RETHINKING PATENT LAW, supra note 21, at 63–64 (discussing that the Federal
Circuit ruled that the behavior did not meet Professional Real Estate’s
objectively baseless test) (citing GP Indus. v. Eran, 500 F.3d at 1374)).
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drafted.100 One could also argue that the uncertainty flows from
the way in which the modern patent system operates, through
practice at the Patent & Trademark Office and custom among
patent prosecutors.101 Regardless of the origin, the patent system
provides so much room for argument over each word and each
implication, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to establish that
all of the patent holder’s arguments were completely baseless, even
when a patent holder has lost every individual argument. This is
the patent system, after all, in which the Federal Circuit once ruled
that “a” can mean “more than one” unless the patent holder
evidenced clear intent to limit the meaning of the word.102 It is also
the patent system in which the Supreme Court recently held that a
patent claim is acceptable if it is “reasonably certain,” rather than
“insolubly ambiguous.”103 All of this uncertainty has the merry
outcome of ensuring that a patent holder can almost always argue
that a position might have been something more than baseless.
Finally, the Justices have already demonstrated, in another
context, that they are wary of extending antitrust’s objectively and
subjectively baseless test to patent law. The Federal Circuit had
borrowed that test from antitrust and applied it to determining
under the Patent Act whether a case is so exceptional that it
justifies a fee award. In last term’s Octane case, the Court rejected
the Federal Circuit’s importation of the objectively and subjectively
baseless test, noting “[t]he threat of antitrust liability (and the
attendant treble damages) far more significantly chills the exercise
of the right to petition than does the mere shifting of attorneys’
fees.”104
100. See RETHINKING PATENT LAW, supra note 21.
101. See id. at Chapter 2, How Modern Patents Operate.
102. See ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW 178 (2009) (citing
Baldwin Graphic Systems, Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2008)).
103. See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014).
On remand, the Federal Circuit implied somewhat sarcastically that little has
changed, noting “The Court has accordingly modified the standard by which
lower courts examine allegedly ambiguous claims; we may now steer by the
bright star of ‘reasonable certainty,’ rather than the unreliable compass of
‘insoluble ambiguity.’” Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d 1374,
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
104. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
1749, 1757 (2014) (citations omitted). The extended quote without citations is the
following:
ICON argues that the dual requirement of ‘subjective bad faith’ and
‘objective baselessness’ follows from this Court’s decision in Professional Real
Estate Investors (PRE), which involved an exception to the Noerr-Pennington
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In short, the type of careful analysis the Supreme Court has
used when choosing to apply Noerr analysis would suggest that
Noerr is inappropriate for these circumstances. In analyzing
whether the First Amendment’s right to petition government
should prevent states from regulating patent demands outside of
lawsuits, the analysis falls in favor of the states. Without a careful
analysis of this kind, however, the Federal Circuit has blithely
applied Noerr. Weaving this together with its exceedingly thin
preemption threads, the Federal Circuit has reached its conclusion
that state laws regulating patent demand behavior outside of
litigation are preempted unless the behavior is objectively and
subjectively baseless. Other courts have followed suit, raising the
concern that the doctrinal entanglement will spill over into other
preemption analyses.105
III. A PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
As described above, on the basis of exceedingly limited
analysis, the Federal Circuit has held that state statutes related to
patent behavior are preempted unless the behavior is in bad faith.
The fact that the analysis is weak, however, does not answer the
question of what a full-blown preemption analysis might look like.
After all, patent law is a federal scheme, and it cannot be that states
are free to rummage around in everything related to patents.
Moreover, the Supreme Court, in dicta, lists patent law in its litany
of uniquely federal areas of regulation.106 Thus, what might be the

doctrine of antitrust law. It does not . . . the Federal Circuit imported the PRE
standard into § 285. But the PRE standard finds no roots in the text of § 285,
and it makes little sense in the context of determining whether a case is so
‘exceptional’ as to justify an award of attorney’s fees in patent litigation. The
threat of antitrust liability (and the attendant treble damages) far more
significantly chills the exercise of the right to petition than does the mere shifting
of attorney’s fees.
105. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d
903 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (rejecting case related to patent demand letters outside
litigation); Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle Bancorp, Inc., No. 8:13CV215, 2013
WL 5963142 (D. Neb. Nov. 7, 2013) (blocking, on First Amendment grounds
among others, Nebraska state attorney general actions to prevent a law firm
from sending cease and desist patent letters).
106. See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1983
(2011) (listing patent as example of an “area of dominant federal concern” in a
case related to state business licensing requirements and immigration); see also
POM Wonderful v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2239–40 (2014) (finding that
the Lanham Act is integral in the federal regulation of misleading labels).
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contours of state authority to regulate behavior that is in any way
relates to patents?
A. Preemption in General
Understanding the relationship between the power of the states
and the power of the federal government has been a complex
challenge since the founding of the nation. Scholars have debated
the nature of early conceptions of the federal government’s
relationship to the states—with some arguing that early federalism
involved separate spheres delineating the exclusive domains of
federal and state authority,107 and others arguing that such dualism
was no more than a rhetorical device that not followed in practice.
The modern approach to the relationship between the states and
the federal government, however, is undoubtedly one of
concurrent and overlapping powers, with numerous state and
federal regulatory programs existing in parallel.108 Using a very
broad brush, one could say that the general approach today is that
state law can coexist with federal law, unless there is a very good
reason to the contrary.
At the core of these issues, lies preemption. Preemption flows
from the Supremacy clause of the Constitution, which holds that
“[t]he Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme law of the
land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
107. Young, supra note 1; see also Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 322
(1913) (noting that while “state and Nation [have] different spheres of jurisdiction
[ ] it must be kept in mind that we are one people; and the powers reserved to
the states and those conferred on the nations are adapted to be exercised,
whether independently or concurrently, to promote the general welfare . . . .”);
Ernest A. Young, The Puzzling Persistence of Dual Federalism, in FEDERALISM
AND SUBSIDIARITY, 34–82 (2014); Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualism to
Polyphony, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF
FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 33, 42 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009). See
generally Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1
(1950) (describing the transition from “dual federalism” to concurrent powers).
Corwin refers to this as cooperative federalism, if you prefer to use his language.
Id. at 19–21.
108. Numerous jurisprudential moments have left little doubt about the
concurrent nature of federal and state powers. These include the arrival of
Roosevelt’s New Deal, the increasing movement of the federal government into
the role of a regulatory state, and the expansion of Congressional authority in
the sphere of interstate commerce through a broadening conception of the
Commerce Clause. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 106. On the state side,
these involved transformation of the negative commerce clause doctrine—which
had seriously constricted state power—into a nondiscrimination rule. See id.
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anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding.”109 And although the federal-state relationship
plays out in different doctrinal forums—including commerce clause
and sovereign immunity analyses—preemption has occupied so
critical a role in recent years, that one scholar has called
preemption, “the most important issue in modern federalism.” 110
Despite its central role in modern debates—or perhaps because of
it—preemption doctrine has suffered an avalanche of criticism.111
Preemption generally comes in three forms, although courts
and scholars argue about the areas of overlap between the three.
These three forms are express preemption, field preemption, and
conflict preemption.112 For express preemption, Congress must
specify that it is exercising authority to preempt state law. Express
preemption language, however, does not necessarily end the
inquiry into whether a state is acting appropriately. In various
cases, the Court’s analysis has shifted to examining the extent to
which Congress intended to displace state law and the areas
covered by the language.113
On the flip side, express language is not the only way in which
federal law may preempt state law. Federal law may still preempt
state law if the “federal regulation [is] so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room to supplement
it.”114 As described in the 2015 Supreme Court decision of Oneok
v. Learjet, field preemption occurs when Congress “intended to
foreclose any state regulation in the area, irrespective of whether
109. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
110. See Garrick Pursley, Preemption in Congress, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 511,
513 (2010); see also Young, supra note 1, at 254–55 (discussing Pursley’s
comment and noting that although the reach of the commerce clause and state
sovereign immunity may garner headlines, preemption constitutes the functional
heart of the Court’s federalism).
111. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV.
1, 2 (2013).
112. For a general discussion of preemption, see Jeanne C. Fromer, The
Intellectual Property Clause’s Preemptive Effect, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND THE COMMON LAW 265, 279 (Shayamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2014); Mark
A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property
Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111 (1999).
113. See, e.g., Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) (finding
lack of preemption despite express language and noting that “[i]f a federal law
contains an express pre-emption clause, it does not immediately end the inquiry
because the question of the substance and scope of Congress’ displacement of
state law still remains”).
114. PG&E v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S.
190, 204 (1983) (citing Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,
152 (1982)).
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state law is consistent or inconsistent with federal standards.”115
The key battleground, however, occurs not with express or field
preemption, but with the third area—conflict preemption. With
conflict preemption, either “compliance with both federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility” or “state law ‘stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution’” of the federal
scheme.116 Thus, the two brands of conflict preemption can be
described as the “impossibility” type and the “obstacle” type.
There are numerous modern disputes among the Justices
regarding the proper analysis for conflict preemption, but in
particular, Justice Thomas has maintained a consistent minority
viewpoint that obstacle preemption is not a valid basis for ousting
state authority.117
Another area of confusion within federalism is a series of recent
cases regarding the existence of a presumption against
preemption—the so-called “Rice” rule.118 The issue flows from
language in the 1933 case of Mintz v. Baldwin, in which the Court
held that “[t]he purpose of Congress to supersede or exclude state
action . . . is not lightly to be inferred. The intention so to do must
definitely and clearly appear,” and the logic echoed 14 years later
in the case of Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator.119 The Justices disagree
115. See Oneok v. Learjet, 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 (2015) (internal citation
marks omitted).
116. See id.
117. See Oneok v. Learjet, 135 S. Ct. at 1603 (Thomas, J., concurring in
part) (“I have doubts about the legitimacy of . . . defining the pre-empted field in
light of the objectives of the Act.”) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583, 594 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring
in judgment) (finding that the “Court’s entire body of ‘purposes and objectives’
pre-emption jurisprudence is inherently flawed” and is so removed from the
statutory text that it is inconsistent with the Constitution); Hillman v. Maretta,
133 S. Ct. 1943, 1955 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (same);
Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., 562 U.S. 323, 340 (2011) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment) (same); PLIVA v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2590 n.13
(2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (explaining that in writing for the majority,
Justice Thomas employed a “novel expansion of impossibility pre-emption”).
See also Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000); Young, supra
note 1, at 328, 328–32 (explaining Justice Thomas’ jurisprudence that
impossibility is the only valid basis for finding conflict preemption and
describing that jurisprudence in detail).
118. The Rice rule arises from the case of Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218 (1947).
119. Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 350 (1933); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator,
331 U.S. at 350. For in depth discussion of the development of the Rice rule and
the variations and debates across time, see Young, supra note 1; Mary J. David,
Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967, 971
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vigorously over whether, and under what circumstances, a formal
presumption exists. As the debate rages on, the modern inquiry
has become somewhat circular, making it less useful as a
principled basis for decision making. In particular, the rule in Rice
is framed as a presumption against preempting state activity when
Congress has legislated in an area that the states have traditionally
occupied. Sometimes, however, the Court has inverted the notion,
framing the question in terms of whether the area has a history of
significant federal presence, rather than whether the area has a
history of significant state presence.120 As commentators have
noted, the inquiry largely depends on how you frame the question,
rather than any principle one can hold onto. Consider the Whiting
case from 2011.121 The case concerned a state business licensing
statute that included provisions related to hiring undocumented
workers. One could characterize the issue as relating to
immigration—a traditional area of federal activity—or relating to
business licensing—a traditional area of state concern.122 In an era
of concurrent powers, the Rice rule risks becoming more of a
justification for a decision than a basis for the decision.
Interpreting the boundaries of legislation is always an
enterprise fraught with difficulty. As I have discussed at length in
the past, human nature and the structure of legal argument
constantly drive law into new territory, as those wishing to escape
the constraints of precedent reach for the open spaces, the
interstices among those things that have been decided.123
(2002); Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
767, 787 (1994).
120. See U.S. v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 90, 108 (2000) (discussing “when the
State regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal
presence”) reviewed by Young, supra note 1, at 334 (describing the shift in
Locke from discussing state presence to federal presence).
121. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
122. See Young, supra note 1, at 336; see generally Daryl J. Levinson,
Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 1311 (2002).
123. See FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW, supra note 102, at 79–90
(2009); see also Young, supra note 1, at 316–17 (stressing the importance of rules
of statutory construction since “[a]ll new laws, though penned with the greatest
skill and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as
more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and
ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 37, at 236 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cook ed., Wesleyan
Univ. Press 1961) (1788))); cf. Feldman & Lemley, supra note 217, at 13–18
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Iowa Law Review) (arguing that the
boundaries of a patent cannot be fully understood until the end of the patent
term, when all questions about the patent that will be asked, have been asked).
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Nevertheless, various themes and sensitivities emerge from the
modern preemption case law. At a general level, these include a
certain fidelity to what Congress has actually intended,124 although
there are differing views on the meaning of silence.125 These also
include sensitivity to courts supplanting congressional decisionmaking. Thus, for example, modern case law would not allow
courts to say what Congress would have decided, if it had thought
about the issue.126 Similarly, there is an instinct to hold the
legislators’ feet to the fire.127 Thus, one might try to avoid allowing
Congress to shirk its duty by creating ambiguous language, leaving
each side to argue in court that it won on the Hill,128 or failing to
give notice to those on the Hill who would defend the states
124. See, e.g., New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (noting that preemption
claims turn on congressional intent and, therefore, must begin with statutory
construction); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“‘The purpose
of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case.” (quoting
Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963))); see also PLIVA, 131 S.
Ct. at 2590–91 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing the Rice rule and
the Court’s history of requiring a “clear and a manifest purpose” to preempt);
Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008) (“When the text of a preemption clause is susceptible of more than one plausible reading, courts
ordinarily ‘accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption’” (quoting Bates v. Dow
Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005))). See also, e.g., Calvin Massey,
“Joltin’ Joe Has Left and Gone Away”: The Vanishing Presumption Against
Preemption, 66 ALB. L. REV. 759, 763 (2003) (arguing in a discussion of United
States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000), that “[i]n the absence of a clear directive
from Congress, the burden of proof of preemptive intent ought to be on those
asserting such congressional intent” and showing that modern scholars echo the
Supreme Court’s exhortation).
125. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 546 (1992) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“To be sure, our jurisprudence
abounds with rules of ‘plain statement,’ ‘clear statement,’ and ‘narrow
construction’ designed variously to ensure that, absent unambiguous evidence of
Congress's intent, extraordinary constitutional powers are not invoked, or
important constitutional protections eliminated, or seemingly inequitable
doctrines applied . . . . But none of those rules exists alongside a doctrine
whereby the same result so prophylactically protected from careless explicit
provision can be achieved by sheer implication, with no express statement of
intent at all. That is the novel regime the Court constructs today.”).
126. Cf. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011)
(noting that class arbitration was not envisioned when Congress passed the
federal act in 1925 and that it is a relatively recent development).
127. See, e.g., PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2582 (“Congress and the FDA retain
the authority to change the law and regulations if they so desire.”).
128. Cf. Young, supra note 4, at 1359 (noting that when a governmental
actor seeks to blur responsibility, it is attempting to shift the political costs onto
other governmental entities).
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against Congressional intrusion.129 As one scholar has noted, “If
our system of political checks is to rest on a foundation of popular
loyalty, the people need to know when to get upset and at
whom.”130 These are general and useful themes.
All of these themes take place against a backdrop of
concurrent powers. Numerous overlapping state and federal
regimes exist. For example, states are allowed to impose additional
notice requirements on the sale of securities.131 Similarly, banking
operates under a dual system with chartering allowed at either the
national or the state level. As the Treasury Department has noted:
Commentators and state bank supervisors rightly assert, for
example, that a separate system of state banks allows the
states to serve as laboratories for innovation and change,
not only in bank powers and structures, but also in the area
of consumer protection. State supervisors also make what
is, in effect, a “smaller is better” argument in favor of the
attributes of state systems, lauding the physical proximity of
state bank regulators to the institutions they supervise,
suggesting that state banks have greater access to state
regulators and that geographic proximity gives state
regulators greater familiarity with the banks they oversee.132
Although coexistence is not always peaceful nor are the
boundaries crystal clear, the notion of such coexistence is deeply
engrained. What would be outside the norm would be an area that
is exclusively reserved to one or the other, particularly without
express language in the relevant federal act delineating it as
“federal only; states keep out.”

129. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991) (noting the
importance of not giving “the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere
Congressional ambiguity”); see also Young, supra note 4, at 1359 (discussing the
Gregory v. Ashcroft passage in the context of providing adequate notice to those
in Congress who would defend the states).
130. Young, supra note 4, at 1360.
131. This is true even for offerings that were made exempt from so-called
state “Blue Sky” laws in the 1996 National Securities Markets Improvement Act.
See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290,
§ 18(c)(2), 110 STAT. 3416, 3419 (1996).
132. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, NATIONAL BANKS AND THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM 10 (2003)
(internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/
publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/national-banks-andthe-dual-banking-system.pdf.
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Into this pantheon of preemption jurisprudence comes patent
law. The Constitution provides Congress the power to grant rights
to inventors for limited times, in order to promote the progress of
the useful arts.133 This power has been realized through various
federal Patent Acts. As the Court has noted, “Patents are not given
as favors, as was the case of monopolies given by the Tudor
monarchs,” but are “meant to encourage invention.”134 The
innovation benefit to society is the anchoring concept of the
granting of patents. Throughout patent jurisprudence, the words of
the Justices ring from a decision of more than 150 years old; in
encouraging invention, “the rights and welfare of the community
must be fairly dealt with and effectually guarded.”135
In recent years, and particularly as the public debate about
patent trolls has heated up, some commentators have begun calling
patents “property rights,” while others argue against doing so.136
133. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
134. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) (internal
citations omitted).
135. Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 329 (1858); see also Woodbridge v.
U.S., 263 U.S. 50, 61 (1923) (explaining that “[t]he public . . . is a most material
party to, and should be duly considered in, every application for a patent,
securing to the individual a monopoly for a limited time, in consideration for the
exercise of his genius and skill,” so as to further the “large public policy to
promote . . . science and the useful arts”); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.
1, 9 (1966) (“The patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor
his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to
bring forth new knowledge.”); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–36 (1966)
(“The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress
for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public [and
therefore, a patent] is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its
successful conclusion.”); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480
(1974) (“The productive effort thereby fostered [by patent laws] will have a
positive effect on society through the introduction of new products and
processes of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of
increased employment and better lives for our citizens.”).
136. See, e.g., Doug Schoen, Congress Must Act On Patent Reform,
FORBES (May 21, 2015, 8:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougschoen/
2015/05/21/congress-must-act-on-patent-reform/ (“A patent is a property right
granted through the [USPTO] to protect a specific invention and to prevent
others from making, using, or selling that invention.”); Time to Fix Patents, THE
ECONOMIST (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21660522ideas-fuel-economy-todays-patent-systems-are-rotten-way-rewarding-them-time-fix
(arguing that patents are not an absolute property right). For perspectives on the
notion that patents were not historically treated as property rights, see, e.g.,
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 58–59, 94–96 (2001) (explaining the
historic view of patents and copyrights as special, limited monopolies); SIVA
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From a constitutional perspective, the respect for real property
evidenced in constitutional language and history is worlds apart
from what is reflected in the Constitution’s intellectual property
clause. The intellectual property clause gives Congress the power
to grant rights for limited times in pursuit of a specific goal. This
creation of a narrow public franchise for limited policy reasons
stands in sharp contrast to the Framers’ conception of core private
property rights, and the way in which those rights are treated in the
Constitution. I use the term “franchise” with some trepidation,
because it can be easily confused with the type of Tudor favors
that the Founders clearly rejected.137 Nevertheless, in the language
of constitutional history, the term “franchise” seems appropriate.
Justices Thomas and Alito highlighted that patents are not core
property rights in their 2015 dissent in the Teva case.138 The case
VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS 23–24 (2001) (historic view
of patents and copyrights as a necessary evil); Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the
Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 567 (2007) (explaining the
difference between “core” private rights and “privileges” or “franchises”);
Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property
Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 1 (2004) (arguing that the “propertization” of
intellectual property has been a revolutionary change in the past generation);
Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and
Copyright Clause, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 909, 919 (2002)
(describing founding perspectives of patents and copyrights as limited
monopolies); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of
Property, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 873, 895–904 (1997) (book review) (objecting to
“propertization” of intellectual property and exploring property rhetoric in
intellectual property policy debates); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual
Property, and Free Riding, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1031, 1033 (2005) (noting that the
modern “propertization” of intellectual property lies in a shift in terminology in
which the descriptive term “intellectual property” takes hold). For an opposing
viewpoint, in the context of the Constitution’s takings clause, see Adam Mossoff,

Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of Patents
Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 691 (2007) (asserting that patents
were secured as constitutional private property in the nineteenth century); but
see Shubha Ghosh, Toward a Theory of Regulatory Takings for Intellectual
Property: The Path Left open After College Savings v. Florida Prepaid , 37 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 637, 667 (2000) (arguing that the takings clause can be applied to
intellectual property or intangible property only by analogy); Thomas F. Cotter,
Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Property Implicate the Fifth Amendment? , 50
FLA. L. REV. 529, 529 (1998) (characterizing the law of takings in relation to
intellectual property as a muddle).
137. See supra text accompanying note 134; see also Camilla A. Hrdy, State
Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez Faire, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 54 (2013)
(describing the Founders’ intent to avoid a patchwork of patent rights that were
conditioned on state-specific terms and conditions).
138. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831, 848 (2015)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
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concerned an esoteric area of patent law, but the dissenting
opinion included historic perspectives discussing the contrast
between patents and property:
The Anglo-American legal tradition has long distinguished
between “core” private rights—including the traditional
property rights represented by deeds—and other types of
rights. These other rights [include] “privileges” or
“franchises,” “which public authorities have created purely
for reasons of public policy and which ha[ve] no
counterpart in the Lockean state of nature. Notwithstanding
a movement to recognize a core property right in
inventions, the English common law placed patents
squarely in the final category as franchises . . . .139
As the text of the dissent explained further, our own “Framers
adopted a similar scheme.”140 In other words, from a constitutional
perspective, patent rights simply are not analogous to property
rights. They are, however, government grants established by the
federal Patent Act, which means that state statutes and common
laws that intersect with patents should be analyzed under
preemption doctrine.
In approaching this question, it is tempting to grab hold of a set
of messy cases related to preemption in intellectual property.
These cases are from the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, with each
decade representing one swing of the pendulum. Specifically, in
the companion cases of Sears and Compco, the Court ruled that
patent law preempted interpretations of two state statutes extending
patent-like protection for copying articles that would not qualify for
protection under the Patent Act.141 In both cases state unfair
competition laws would have been interpreted to protect against
copying lighting fixtures that did not qualify for patent protection.
The Justices held that such an approach was preempted.
In contrast, the Goldstein, Kewanee, and Aaronson cases
allowed intellectual property protection under state statutes for
articles that did not qualify for copyright or patent protection. In
Goldstein, the Court upheld a state statute protecting against
copying sound recordings, which were not protected under the
139. Id. at 848 n.2 (citations omitted) (quoting Caleb Nelson, Adjudication
in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 567 (2007)).
140. Id. at 847.
141. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232–33 (1964);
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238–39 (1964).
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Copyright Act.142 In Kewanee, the Court upheld a state statute
protecting against misappropriation of trade secrets, including
innovations that would not qualify for protection under the Patent
Act.143 In Aronson, the Court upheld the application of state
contract law to enforce royalty payments to a patent applicant after
the application was rejected.144 In each of these cases, the Court
found no preemption.
Finally, in 1989, the Court swung back in the other direction in
a case related to moldings for boat hulls. In Bonito Boats, the
Court ruled that patent law preempted a state statute that forbid
using a direct molding process to copy unpatented boat hulls.145
Some of the language in the opinions, located at both ends of
the pendular arc, is troubling for its largely unmoored policy
analysis of whether the incentives created by the various state
intellectual property schemes would be consistent with the
incentives created by the federal scheme. At times, these analyses
come perilously close to encouraging judges to substitute their own
judgment for that of Congress. For example, in discussing the
patent system’s emphasis on disclosure in Kewanee, the Court
noted the following:
[I]t is hard to see how the public would be benefited by
disclosure of customer lists or advertising campaigns; in
fact, keeping such items secret encourages businesses to
initiate new and individualized plans of operation, and
constructive competition results. This, in turn, leads to a
greater variety of business methods than would otherwise
be the case if privately developed marketing and other data
were passed illicitly among firms involved in the same
enterprise.146
Such discussions threaten to encroach on the economic and
policy choices adopted by Congress. Similarly, in Bonito Boats, the
court focused on “the policies behind the patent system.”147
Explaining why state trade secret protection was not preempted
while boat hull protection was, the opinion expounded on the
different incentives created, in a manner that seemed somewhat
142.
143.
144.
145.
(1989).
146.
147.

Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 571 (1973).
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974).
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 266 (1979).
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168

Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 483.
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156.
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unmoored. Noting that the boat hull statute would be “eroding the
general rule of free competition upon which the attractiveness of
the federal patent bargain depends,”148 the opinion compared the
incentive structures of the different state schemes:
The protections of state trade secret law are most effective
at the developmental stage, before a product has been
marketed and the threat of reverse engineering becomes
real. During this period, patentability will often be an
uncertain prospect, and to a certain extent, the protection
offered by trade secret law may “dovetail” with the
incentives created by the federal patent monopoly. In
contrast, under the Florida scheme, the would-be inventor
is aware from the outset of his efforts that rights against the
public are available regardless of his ability to satisfy the
rigorous standards of patentability.149
In discussing the Kewanee/Bonito Boats line of cases, one
scholar noted that it represents a court’s own factual findings
without the benefit of empirical studies. He further notes that this
methodology leads to the “sort of conclusion [that] makes critics of
Bonito Boats uneasy because they fear the Court will use this
casual approach to strike down state laws merely on efficiency
150
grounds.” In other words, regardless of whether the right result
occurred in these cases, some of the analysis wanders widely.
Bonito Boats also makes a muddle of the question of whether
the Patent Act creates field preemption. As described above, field
148. Id. at 161.
149. Id. (citations omitted). At the end of the day, approval of state trade
secret laws may have depended heavily on the fact that they have existed across
time with tacit recognition by Congress. See id. at 166 (“The law of unfair
competition and state trade secret law have coexisted harmoniously with federal
patent protection for almost 200 years. . . .”). This cannot, however, explain
Goldstein’s approval of state protection for then uncopyrightable sound
recordings. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 576 (1973) (holding that,
under the Constitution, the states have not relinquished all power to grant to
authors “the exclusive Right to their respective Writings” and that until Congress
takes further action, the California statute against piracy may be enforced).
150. Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics of
Preemption, 76 IOWA L. REV. 959, 978 (1991) (emphasis removed). Heald took
comfort that although Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Bonito Boats “recommends
economic analysis to determine the existence of direct conflicts with the
mechanics of federal law, it does not authorize courts to use freewheeling
findings of inefficiency in spite of the Court’s own use of sloppy ‘fact-finding’ in
cases such as Kewanee.” Id. (emphasis removed). I find the logic in the line of
cases less reassuring than Heald did.
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preemption exists when the federal regulation is entirely pervasive,
while conflict preemption exits either when it is impossible to
comply with both the state and the federal scheme or when the
state scheme stands as an obstacle to the federal one. 151 Prior
Supreme Court cases had suggested that field preemption does not
exist for patent law. Specifically, the Sears opinion used language
that evokes the notion of the state scheme creating an obstacle to
the federal one, rather than field preemption language: “When
state law touches upon the area of these federal statutes, it is
‘familiar doctrine’ that the federal policy ‘may not be set at naught,
or its benefits denied’ by the state law.”152
Similarly, the Compco companion case used conflict
preemption language, finding the state law was “in conflict with the
federal patent laws” and that it would “interfere” with the
intellectual property clause of the constitution and the
implementing copyright and patent laws.153 Kewanee followed the
same path: “[T]here is ‘neither such actual conflict between the two
schemes of regulation that both cannot stand in the same area, nor
evidence of a congressional design to pre-empt the field.’”154
Likewise Aronson also specifically analyzed the question under
conflict preemption: “In this as in other fields, the question of
whether federal law pre-empts state law ‘involves a consideration of
whether that law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”155

151. See supra text accompanying notes 97–101.
152. Sears, Roebuck & Co.v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) (quoting
Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 173, 176 (1942)).
153. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
Citing the language in Sears, among other arguments, one scholar has suggested
that the intellectual property clause of the Constitution should be considered a
separate basis for preemption outside of the Supremacy Clause—one that would
prevent states from extending protections for copyright holders beyond what is
provided in the Copyright Act. See Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property
Clause’s Preemptive Effect 8–9 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-71, 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2194755. She acknowledges,
however, that language in the Goldstein opinion makes it unlikely that the Court
will take such an approach; see also supra text accompanying notes 100–104
(“Although some see the Supreme Court’s assertions as dicta that could be
worked around in future cases, it is unlikely that the Court will soon come to see
the IP clause as working on its own to preempt state laws.”) (citations omitted).
154. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 494 (1974) (quoting
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963)).
155. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (quoting
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 479) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Bonito Boats, however, contained muddled language about
whether field preemption applies to the Patent Act. Some of the
language appears to specifically reject the notion that the Patent
Act creates field preemption. For example, in discussing Sears and
Compco, the Bonito Boats decision explains that at the “highest
level of generality,” the two cases could be interpreted to mean
that states “are completely disabled from offering any form of
protection to articles or processes which fall within the broad scope
of patentable subject matter.”156 The opinion then rejects such a
broad interpretation, holding that “extrapolation of such a broad
pre-emptive principle from Sears is inappropriate” given that
opinion’s “implicit recognition that all state regulation of potentially
patentable but unpatented subject matter is not ipso facto preempted by the federal patent laws.”157
Notwithstanding such conflict preemption language and
analysis, Bonito Boats, concludes with language that invokes the
classic field preemption analysis:
[The state] thus enters a field of regulation which the patent
laws have reserved to Congress. The patent statute’s careful
balance between public right and private monopoly to
promote certain creative activity is a “scheme of federal
regulation . . . so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it.”158
Ultimately, however, Sears, Kewanee, and Bonito Boats are
tangential at best in analyzing the preemptive effect of patent troll
legislation because the cases concern efforts by the states to create
protections—specifically for things that federal patent and copyright
do not protect. The creation of state intellectual property
protection schemes raises the tricky question of whether Congress
intended that anything unprotected should be left in the public
domain. Moreover, the fact that Congress created uniform patent
and copyright acts prompts particular sensitivity when states try to
impose their own, differing protections. In contrast, an effort to
provide limits on the behavior in which patent holders may engage
156. Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 154 (1989)
(citing Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 677 (1969)).
157. Id. Similar to Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 491, the Bonito Boats opinion also
speaks of conflict and interference with the federal patent laws. See Bonito
Boats, 489 U.S. at 160, 165.
158. Id. at 167 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)).
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implicates a different set of issues.159 When examining state activity
related to adequacy of contracts, sales behavior, or consumer
disclosure, for example, one would certainly ask whether federal
legislation preempts state action—either because the federal
legislation expressly preempts state activity or because the state
activity improperly conflicts with the federal scheme. Nevertheless,
analysis of these issues would delve into questions other than those
that arise with state creation of additional schemes for the
protection of inventions.
Most importantly, despite the muddled language in Bonito
Boats, conflict preemption is the more likely inquiry for issues
related to patents. It would be difficult to square field preemption
with cases upholding state trade secret law.160 In addition, the
entire approach in Bonito Boats, both the policy analysis and the
analysis of field preemption, follows a less particularized approach
than preemption analysis in this millennium, which tends to be
more precisely grounded in the words of the relevant statute.161
159. See Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013) (Supreme Court held that
state court had jurisdiction even given arising under language).
160. Cf. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1068 (2013) (finding in a case
related to a state court’s ability to hear a malpractice claim based on whether a
patent would have been approved that “[a]s we recognized a century ago, ‘[t]he
Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of all cases arising under the patent
laws, but not of all questions in which a patent may be the subject-matter of the
controversy’” (quoting New Marshall Engine Co. v. Marshall Engine Co., 223
U.S. 473, 478 (1912))).
161. Compare Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 154
(1989), with Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1970
(2011) (grounding the discussion of the policy breadth in the wording of the
statute), and AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Vincent Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745
(2011) (same). Even with the divided opinions, both the majority and the dissent
go to great lengths to ground their analysis in the text. See Geier v. American
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869–70 (2000) (finding that “[n]othing in the
language of the saving clause suggests an intent to save state-law tort actions that
conflict with federal regulations”); cf. id. at 900 n.16 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(finding textual basis in the statutory language that the “saving clause
unquestionably limits, and possibly forecloses entirely, the pre-emptive effect
that [federally promulgated] safety standards . . . have on common-law
remedies”); Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591,1596, 1601 (pointing to
§§ 1 and 5 of the Natural Gas Act to delineate the limited scope of FERC’s ratesetting authority); cf. id. at 1604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding that § 717(d) of
the Natural Gas Act “empowers the Commission to regulate ‘practices affecting
wholesale rates’” and that “[n]othing in the Act suggests that States share power
to regulate these practices”); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 232–33
(2011) (noting that given the “well known triumvirate of ground for [products]
liability,” there is no implied preemption for defective design where the statute
expressly preserves the other two); cf. id. at 266 (finding that the majority’s
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And, of course, if field preemption were the proper test, states
would be completely preempted from acting in the realm. Even
state laws related to fraud and bad faith would be beyond the
scope of appropriate regulation. For these reasons, the more likely
analysis is of the type evidenced in Aronson, in which the Court
found that “state law is not displaced merely because the contract
relates to intellectual property which may or may not be
patentable.”162
Once in the realm of concurrent powers, rather than total field
preemption, there is much that would concern the states in the
legitimate exercise of their authority. To begin with, the granting of
patents in the Patent Act relies upon and presupposes a
functioning state system of commerce and contract law. Without
this, inventors would be unable to form the commercial
relationships necessary to bring their ideas to fruition. A patent is
not a prize or an award; it is an opportunity to try to garner a
return by creating products from the ideas embodied in the patent
and bringing those products to market for the benefit of society.
Patent holders however, are not required to create the product
themselves, and society may be better served if patent holders
choose to license their patents to others, who can create products
from the ideas and bring value for society. Forcing vertical
integration—with one party required to engage in all aspects from
idea to product design to production—is hardly the preferred
approach for a well-functioning economy. Thus, the federal Patent
Act is predicated on local legal systems for contracts and
commerce.163 It is a classic case in which the federal and the state
systems must work hand in hand, as opposed to a federal scheme
that would be capable of regulating with sufficient particularity and
would reign supreme.
Certainly, parties should not be able to utilize state law to
contract around the patent system.164 Nevertheless, when the
federal scheme relies upon the functioning of an underlying state
system, preemption of that state function should require at least a
clear expression of federal intent. In those circumstances, in
textual analysis ignores the Vaccine Act’s default rule to preserve state law
under § 22(a), thereby preserving state-law design defect claims).
162. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
163. Cf. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (“The structure and
operation of the [Controlled Substances Act] presume and rely upon a
functioning medical profession regulated under the States’ police powers.”).
164. See Brief for Professor Robin Feldman, et al. as Amici Curiae at 9,
Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t., Inc. 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) (No. 13-720); Feldman,
supra note 21, at 136–78.
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particular, courts should be wary of arguments that rest with light
levels of support on the fringes of a broad interpretation of
supposed congressional purposes.
Beyond the background commerce and contract systems
necessary for patent licensing, states traditionally have played a
role in disciplining abusive or improper assertion of legal rights. 165
Thus, while a federal rights system such as the Patent Act may
serve the purpose of promoting innovation, states in this posture
serve different purposes,166 ones that are of local importance in
their jurisdictions, such as the maintenance of appropriate societal
behaviors. These commercial, contractual, and legal assertion
issues also may touch on other concerns that are distinctly local
and may vary across localities, from wage impacts, to effects on
hiring of local skilled and unskilled workers, to the creation of
industry clusters.167 Regardless of whether one believes that
experimentation in innovation policies may be useful across
jurisdictions,168 commercial, contractual, and consumer laws are
traditionally viewed as appropriate for experimentation across state
jurisdictions, and appropriate forums for reflecting and promoting
local values. To paraphrase one constitutional law scholar, states
must be left with something to do.169 Most important, none of these
expressions of a state’s proper role suggests that a state should be
restricted to the realm of fraud and bad faith.
In examining modern Supreme Court jurisprudence, an
additional theme bubbles up through a number of the cases. It is a
theme that can provide a useful tool for understanding preemption
cases, in general, and patent preemption, in particular. It is not
clearly articulated as such, and it certainly does not play out
consistently in all cases. Nevertheless, it is a useful lens for making
sense out of some of the more difficult questions. One can call the
concept “heart and periphery.” Specifically, a state law that goes to
the heart of federal legislation is more likely to be problematic; a
state law that affects the periphery is more likely to be accepted. A
heart and periphery approach can be vital for analyzing whether
express preemption language is intended to apply to the particular
165. See Gugliuzza, supra note 2, at 24.
166. See id.; see also Fromer, supra note 112, at 279.
167. See Camilla A. Hrdy, Commercialization Awards, 2015 WIS. L. REV.
13 (2015) (discussing state interests in the context of creating commercialization
incentives that do not require creating new forms of exclusive rights).
168. For an interesting exploration of when such experimentation might be
appropriate, see Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101
VIRGINIA L. REV. 65 (2015).
169. See Young, supra note 4, at 1387.
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variation of state law and what preemption implications may exist
in the absence of express language.
Unsurprisingly, difficulties frequently occur when courts are
trying to interpret those things that fall within the interstices, that is,
what Congress did not describe directly—even when there is some
form of preemption language—but arguably relate to or fall within
the ambit of what is covered.170 In the challenging interstitial
spaces, the analysis should consider the focus of the particular
statute or provision at issue. To use a somewhat simplistic
copyright example, if a federal statute creates protection for music,
a state provision that also creates protection for music goes to the
heart of the statute and, thus, is more likely to falter on the shoals
of preemption. A state statute about professional licensing for
musicians is less likely to be preempted. Similarly, if a federal
statute creates intellectual property protection for medical
procedures, a state provision that also creates protection for
medical procedures goes to the heart of the statute while a state
statute about professional licensing for doctors sits at the periphery
and is less likely to be preempted.
The Court has come close to articulating the concept of heart
and periphery. For example, in the case of English v. General
Electric, the Court found the state regulation of how management
handles employee complaints about safety to be too tangential to
federal regulations on what is required for nuclear plant safety.171
In a number of other cases, the lens of heart and periphery brings
clarity to the decisions, even if the Court does not articulate the
concept. Consider AT&T v. Concepcion. The case involved cell
phone contracts providing for arbitration of all disputes and
requiring that claims must be brought individually, and not as part
of a class.172 A cell phone user challenged the class action waiver
as unconscionable under California contract doctrine. The Federal
Arbitration Act contains both a preemption clause and a savings
clause: “[A] contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
170. Cf. Feldman, supra note 102, at 79–90 (arguing that, in the context of
law in general rather than preemption, human nature and the nature of the legal
system relentlessly create evolution by driving the system towards issues within
the interstices of what has come before).
171. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 85–86 (1990) (“[E]ven
though [certain state] laws could be said to affect tangentially some of the
resource allocation decisions that might have a bearing on radiological safety,
[the state tort law claim for IIED] is neither direct nor substantial enough to
place petitioner’s claim in the pre-empted field.”).
172. AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Vincent Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744
(2011).
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to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.”173 The majority upheld the class
action waiver, reading the Arbitration Act as reflecting a liberal
policy favoring arbitration and an intent to enforce arbitration
contracts according to their terms.174 Over the objection of four
dissenting Justices, along with an opinion concurring in the result,
the majority read the language to provide that state law may
invalidate arbitration clauses in the case of generally applicable
contract provisions, but not provisions that derive their meaning
from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.175 Thus, the
Court held the California Supreme Court’s line of decisions finding
many arbitration class action waivers to be unconscionable was
preempted by federal law.
Concepcion may best be understood from the perspective that
promoting arbitration contracts goes to the heart of the Federal
Arbitration Act. Thus, in a close case on the meaning of the
preemption language, the actions of the state court were more
likely to be rejected because the state’s activity went to the heart of
the federal scheme.
While Concepcion parses through the meaning of particular
wording in express preemption language, the concept of heart and
periphery also can be seen in cases involving broader inquiries.
For example, consider Watters v. Wachovia,176 which concerned
whether the National Bank Act preempted state regulation of a
local mortgage entity that was a subsidiary of a national bank. The
federal law contains general language that “[n]o national bank shall
be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal
law.”177 The state had asserted the subsidiary should be subject to
state licensing and auditing regulations, which would not be the
case for a federal bank.178
In describing the interplay of state and federal powers, the
Court in Wachovia took pains to describe the extent to which state
laws may apply to banks operating in their jurisdiction, even when
those banks are federally chartered. The Court noted that state
usury laws may govern the maximum rate of interest charged by a
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2015).
AT&T v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745.
Id. at 1745–46.
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
See id. at 11 (citing National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2006)).
See id. at 6.
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federal bank, contracts made by federal banks are governed and
construed by state law, and their acquisition of property is
governed by state law.179 Nevertheless, the Court found the state
actions preempted as being in conflict with federal banking laws,
even as to a state chartered subsidiary, noting in particular that
“[s]ecurity against significant interference by state regulators is a
characteristic condition of the ‘business of banking’ conducted by
national banks, and mortgage lending is one aspect of that
business.”180 In this case, the state’s activities simply encroached on
the heart of federal banking legislation—that is, the uniform federal
regulation of the day-to-day business of banking.
The notion of looking at the heart of the federal regulation as
opposed to peripheral concerns also may have animated Justice
Scalia’s spirited dissent in this year’s decision of Oneok v. Learjet,
which was joined by Justice Roberts.181 The claim related to state
antitrust law and federal authority over natural gas pricing as
provided in the Natural Gas Act. Justice Scalia objected to the
majority’s argument that the state claims must go forward in order
to avoid trampling state autonomy in many areas.
One need not launch this unbounded inquiry into the
features of state law in order to preserve the States’
authority to apply tax laws, disclosure laws, and blue sky
laws to natural-gas companies. . . . The [Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission’s] authority to regulate gas
pipelines . . . is a power to address matters that are
traditionally the concern of utility regulators, not a broad
license to promote the general welfare.182
In other words, from the dissent’s perspective, application of
state law in this case reached into the heart of federal energy
legislation; one should find preemption without in any way
threatening state autonomy in peripheral areas.
At its best, the current concept of looking at the purposes of
federal legislation to understand the preemption boundaries could
carry the ball for understanding what is central and what is
peripheral. Unfortunately, purposes analysis all too often has
become a wide-ranging and open-ended inquiry in which courts
have reached well beyond what Congress actually articulated in
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 18.
See Oneok v. Learjet, 135 S. Ct. at 1604
See id. at 1607 (internal citation marks omitted).
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the legislation. It can allow the type of unmoored analysis that can
be troubling, bordering on imagining what Congress would have
decided if it had thought about this point. It can also lead opinions
down the garden path of unsupported economic and policy
analysis, for example, exploring what the supposed economic
effects of state IP-like protections might be and whether those
protections are good or bad for national innovation.183 Such
economic and policy analyses generally belong in the legislative
domain, rather than that of the courts. As the Supreme Court
noted in a 2015 patent opinion not related to preemption, claims
related to the consequences of a particular policy for innovation
are more appropriately addressed to Congress, “[t]ruth be told, if
forced to decide that issue, we would not know where or how to
start. Which is one good reason why that is not our job.”184
Moreover, in the context of preemption, this type of broad analysis
risks straying considerably from anything that Congress actually
decided. With its tendency to stray into that territory, the legislative
purposes analysis, as currently configured, falls short.
Moving from the overly broad to the overly narrow, heart and
periphery can be useful concepts for avoiding the type of hypertechnical parsing of words that has tangled up the Court at times.
Consider the case of Altria Group v. Good.185 Altria concerned the
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, which establishes “a
comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette labelling
and advertising with respect to any relationship between smoking
and health.”186 The Act contains express preemption language
providing that “[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking
and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to
advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which
are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.”187
Petitioners had sued under a state unfair trade practices act
alleging that Philip Morris’s cigarette advertising had fraudulently
suggested that its light cigarettes delivered less tar and nicotine to
consumers despite the company’s knowledge that the claim was
188
not true. In concluding that the state act was not preempted, the
Court focused on the words “based on” in the federal act’s phrase,
183. See supra text accompanying notes 134, 145 (describing the Court’s
policy rationale in Sears and Bonito Boats).
184. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t., LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2414 (2015).
185. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 (2008).
186. See 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1984).
187. See 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2009).
188. See Altria Group v. Good, 555 U.S. at 72–73.
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“[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health
shall be imposed under State law with respect to advertising or
promotion of any cigarettes.”189 The majority concluded that the
notion of advertising and promotion “based on smoking and
health” had a much narrower preemptive reach than created by
the words “relating to,” which had been found to have much
broader reach in preemption clauses of the Americans with
Disabilities Act and ERISA legislation.190 The 5-4 decision
included a strong dissent, calling the decision “unwise and
unnecessary” and noting that the majority had chosen to follow a
prior plurality opinion, which the plurality itself had noted “lacked
theoretical elegance.”191
Once again, focusing on what was central to the preemption
provision as opposed to what was peripheral could have
highlighted problems with the majority analysis. The heart of the
federal preemption clause concerned cigarette advertising, which
should have made preemption a more likely finding.
This is not to suggest that the concept of heart and periphery
can solve all of the difficult issues related preemption.
Nevertheless, for the locksmith trying various keys until one
unlocks the door, this adds one more to the ring. Moreover, some
concept similar to heart and periphery must exist for any rational
analysis of preemption in a system of concurrent powers, when
responsibility for governance is shared by state and federal
authorities in so many areas, from disaster response to dispensing
medication, to consumer disclosure laws. Without it, anything the
federal government touches could expand to completely occupy a
field, and the concept of federalism, with its respect for local
autonomy and its reverence for the wellsprings of popular support,
could whither on the vine.192
Looking through the lens of centrality and periphery provides
additional support for concluding that state laws related to patent
demands should be able to reach beyond the realm of fraud. In
the statutory language and history of the federal Patent Act, certain
193
key issues emerge at the heart of the federal scheme.
These
189. Id. at 78–79.
190. See id. at 85–86.
191. See id. at 92, 94 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing the plurality opinion in
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530 (1992)).
192. See Young, supra note 1, at 263–64 (referencing discussions of
federalism in the context of the wellsprings of popular support).
193. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 111–22 (2015) for patent application
procedures; id. at §§ 131–35 for PTO examination procedures; id. at §§ 271,
281–96 for provisions on infringement and damages.
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include the requirements necessary to obtain a patent and the
Patent & Trademark Office procedures for so doing, the definition
of infringement and the measure of damages for infringement, and
the procedures for filing a claim of infringement or challenging the
validity of a patent before the Patent & Trademark Office or in
federal court. These issues—validity, infringement, and federal
litigation—form the heart, and state laws directed at these issues are
more likely to conflict with the federal scheme. Within the
periphery, however, lie a variety of issues that may touch on
patents without going to the heart of the federal scheme. These
include the types of issues described at the start of the Article, such
as, notice requirements, transparency, protection against pressure
sales tactics, basic contract laws, and others. Fraud remediation
would certainly fall within the periphery. Nevertheless, fraud
remediation does not define the entirety of what falls within the
periphery. The lower courts’ attempt to do so represents a
fundamental misunderstanding of the importance of state power
and autonomy in the federal system.
IV. THE FRAUD FALLACY AND CORPORATE SPEECH
The discussion above has examined the fraud fallacy in the
context of the federal doctrine of preemption, but there is an
additional area in which the fraud fallacy threatens to emerge. One
could argue that the final arena is even more troubling, because it
threatens to circumscribe not just state power, but federal power as
well. The topic relates to the power to regulate corporate
speech.194

194. For discussions of modern case law related to corporate speech, see
generally, Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53
B.C. L. REV 1153 (2012) (explaining the ways in which commercial speech
differs from other kinds of speech protected by the First Amendment and
positing that not all commercial speech warrants such protection); Charles
Fischette, A New Architecture Of Commercial Speech Law, 31 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 663 (2008) (contending that the application of the First Amendment
to commercial speech can be justified by several independent, though perhaps
interrelated, theories, depending on the context in which it arises); Robert Post,
The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2000)
(arguing that the Supreme Court should recognize that the doctrine of
commercial speech should be reformulated to recognize that it is different from
fully protected speech, that commercial speech is constitutionally valued for the
information it disseminates rather than for being itself a valuable way of
participating in democratic self-determination); Daniel Halberstam, Commercial

Speech, Professional Speech, and The Constitutional Status Of Social
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In particular, some scholars and commentators195 have tried to
take the notion of First Amendment protections for petitioning the
sovereign unless there is fraud and extend it even further to a more
general First Amendment protection for speech about patents. If
that were true, neither the states nor the federal government could
regulate corporate speech about patents unless the speech falls
within a few narrow categories, which once again, include fraud.196
In addition to the First Amendment clause protecting the right
to petition government, the First Amendment also protects
“freedom of speech.” All speech is not created equal, however,
and the Supreme Court determined long ago that core political
speech receives greater deference than commercial speech. 197
Specifically, the Court defines commercial speech as expression
related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience.198 Although courts have struck down regulations related
Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771 (1999) (presenting a critical review of the
development of the Court's governing commercial speech framework).
195. Adam Mossoff, Demand Letters and Mandatory Disclosures: First
Amendment Concerns, GEORGE MASON U. CENTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BLOG, (Apr. 29, 2014) available at
http://cpip.gmu.edu/2014/04/29/demand-letters-and-mandatory-disclosures-firstamendment-concerns/ (“As property rights, patents can be freely conveyed or
licensed in the marketplace.”); H.R. __, A Bill to Enhance Federal and State

Enforcement of Fraudulent Patent Demand Letters: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 113th Cong. 2d Sess. (2014) (statement of Prof. Adam
Mossoff), available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20140522/102255/
HHRG-113-IF17-Wstate-MossoffA-20140522.pdf; see also Statement of Alex
Rogers, Qualcomm, Inc., at same session for further First Amendment
arguments, available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20140522/102255/
HHRG-113-IF17-Wstate-RogersA-20140522.PDF (“[T]he First Amendment
affords broad protection for activities relating to the enforcement and
communication of patent rights”).
196. See sources cited at note 195, supra; see also cases cited at note 28,
supra.
197. See Zauderer v. Office of Disc. Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985) (applying a rational review test and holding that a state can
require commercial speech to include “purely factual and uncontroversial
information” without violating the First Amendment as long as the disclosure
requirements are “reasonably related” to the state’s interest in protecting
consumers from deception); Cent’l Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563–70 (1980) (holding that heightened but not strict
scrutiny applies to regulation of commercial speech). The lower federal courts
have varied on the level of scrutiny applied in commercial speech cases.
198. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) (defining commercial speech as “speech which
does no more than propose a commercial transaction”) (citing Pitt. Press Co. v.
Pitt. Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973); see also Cent’l
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to commercial speech from time to time, these have tended to fall
into categories including the complete suppression of speech, such
as forbidding advertising, or regulation of a political message
outside the commercial activity of the corporation.199 For example,
courts have expressed particular sensitivity to regulation of
commercial speech that compels a commercial actor to further a
particular political message.200
Hudson v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. at 561 (defining commercial speech as
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience”).
199. See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001) (finding
that a mushroom producer’s First Amendment rights were violated when
disclosure requirements required information that was not purely “factual and
uncontroversial,” especially when the disclosure is normative speech pushing a
governmental agenda); Riley v. Nat’l Fed. of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S 781, 782
(1988) (invalidating a North Carolina law requiring fundraisers to disclose the
portion of each donation retained as their fee and holding that, in light of
concerns over the chilling effect, the commercial speech doctrine did not apply
because the commercial elements of the speech were “inextricably intertwined
with the otherwise fully protected speech involved in charitable solicitations”).
200. For Supreme Court cases evidencing this concern, see cases cited
supra at note 199. Lower court cases on the topic include Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v.
SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (2014) (finding that labeling requirements specifying inclusion
of origin of gems as from either conflict free zones or non-conflict free zones
violate the First Amendment because the governmental interest at issue is not
concerned with preventing consumer deception); Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760
F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (finding that Zauderer applies to
government interests other than those protecting against consumer deception; a
rational basis review determines that required disclosure of country of origin of
meat is purely factual commercial speech and thus permissible under principles
of Zauderer); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (finding that Zauderer decision is limited to cases in which disclosure
requirements are “reasonably related” to state’s interest in preventing the
deception of consumers); Beeman & Pharm Servs v. Anthem, 652 F.3d 1085 (9th
Cir. 2011) (holding that “not all fact-based disclosure requirements are subject to
First Amendment scrutiny”; only disclosures that “affect the content of the
message or speech by forcing the speaker to endorse a particular viewpoint or
by chilling or burdening a message that the speaker would otherwise choose to
make” trigger First Amendment scrutiny); N.Y. Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y. City Bd. of
Health, 556 F.3d 114, 132 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that C entral Hudson’s
“intermediate scrutiny” test is “expressly limited to cases in which a state
disclosure requirement is supported by no interest other than the gratification of
consumer curiosity”; applying rational review standard of Zauderer to uphold a
requirement that restaurants include calorie content on menus, even though it’s
not an issue of consumer deception); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429
F.3d 294, 310, 316 (1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting argument that Zauderer holding is
limited to curing deception in consumer advertising and using Zauderer rational
review standards to find a statute valid that requires disclosure of financial and
business information); Envtl. Def. Ctr. Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 850 (9th Cir.
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One would expect patent demands to fall within the category
of commercial speech. Recent patent commentary, however, has
suggested that licensing demands should not be treated as pure
commercial speech, but rather as some new form of hybrid
speech.201 According to this perspective, patent demands are not
purely commercial because they relate to enforcement of legal
rights, and speech pertaining to enforcement of legal rights ought
to be elevated to a greater level of protection.
Despite this aspirational and creative framing, patent demands
do fall squarely within the confines of commercial speech. It is
difficult to understand how a letter demanding payment for the use
of an invention relates to anything other than the “economic
interests of the parties.” In addition, many communications about
commerce carry the implication, and sometimes the direct
mention, of the potential to resort to the courts to enforce one’s
legal rights. This would be true of everything from contract
negotiations, to employment agreements, to real estate sales, to
anything that contains an arbitration clause. It cannot be that all of
these communications should be elevated from the position of
commercial speech to the high plane generally reserved for core
political communication or even an intermediate plane in which
the government tries to compel a commercial actor to carry a
political message. Nor can it be that the government’s legitimate
interests are limited to fraud remediation or preventing deceptive
practices.202 And, of course, if such limitations were to be true,
2003) (upholding EPA regulations requiring storm sewer providers to distribute
educational materials; Zauderer analysis held not relevant because speech is
purely factual and non-ideological and specific content was not specified); Nat’l
Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 113–16 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the
rational review standards of Zauderer decision is not limited to cases involving
consumer deception but applies to other state interests as well).
201. See Testimony of Adam Mossoff before the Committee on Energy &
Commerce Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade (May 22,
2014) available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/Testimony-Mossoff-CMT-Fraudulent-Patent-Demand-Letters-2014-522.pdf; Mosoff, supra note 195.
202. The circuits disagree over whether the Supreme Court cases can be
read to have such an implication as well. Compare R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ( Zauderer rational basis test is limited to
cases in which disclosure requirements relate to preventing the deception of
consumers), with N.Y. Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114 (2d
Cir. 2009) (applying rational basis review standard of Zauderer to uphold a
requirement that restaurants include calorie content on menus, even though it is
not an issue of consumer deception), and Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe,
429 F.3d 294 (1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting argument that Zauderer holding is limited
to curing deception in consumer advertising and using Zauderer rational basis
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they would apply with equal force to Congressional legislation as
well as state legislation, given that their origin is attributed to the
First Amendment’s protections.
Moreover, the argument threatens to blur the boundaries
between the First Amendment’s right to petition government for
the redress of grievances, which under modern law includes
petitioning the courts, and the First Amendment’s right to free
speech. It is the First Amendment’s “right to petition government”
clause that, through the Noerr line of cases, has been extended to
include enforcing legal rights in court. Sliding that logic over to the
First Amendment’s protection for free speech would mean that we
now have an even further extension of what began as an antitrust
notion about the right to speak to the legislature. That last, rickety
extension—of a doctrine already stretched beyond any semblance
of its original meaning—is simply one bridge too far.
CONCLUSION
The concept of federalism, as applied by the circuit courts in
relation to patents, has travelled far from its roots. Using weak
foundational logic, the courts have taken concepts intended to
protect citizens from the chilling effects of antitrust law and
stretched them to conclude that states may not pass laws related to
patent demands outside of litigation, unless those state laws relate
to remediation of fraud. If allowed to flourish, this fraud fallacy
would prevent state laws from affecting a wide range of behavior,
from transparency, to disclosure, to protection against pressure
sales. As the Court noted in Aronson, “state law is not displaced
merely because the contract relates to intellectual property that
may or may not be patentable.”203
Most importantly, the theory applied to patent preemption
questions threatens to bleed into a wide range of preemption
issues, as well as to issues related to corporate speech. From this
perspective, the fraud fallacy and its wide-ranging language
threatens to have a lasting effect on the ability of state law to reflect
and respond to local democratic demands, as well as even the
federal government’s ability to legislate effectively.
review standards to find a statute valid that requires disclosure of financial and
business information); see also Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You Handle the
Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 539 (2012) (arguing that a rational basis test should apply to
commercial disclosure laws that serve the state’s interest in an informed public,
even if the speaker has not engaged in deceptive or misleading speech).
203. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).

